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Abstract
The Patient Protection and Aordable Care Act expands Medicaid and in-troduces health 
insurance subsidies, thereby changing work incentives for single mothers. To undertake an ex 
ante policy evaluation of the employment eects of the PPACA, I structurally estimate a 
model of labor supply and health in-surance choice exploiting existing variation in Medicaid 
policies. Simulations show that single mothers increase their labor supply at the extensive and 
the intensive margin by six and ve percent, respectively. The PPACA leads to crowding-out 
of employer-sponsored health insurance of about 40 percent and increases single mothers' 
welfare by about $190 per month.
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1 Introduction
The health care reforms passed in 2010 (Patient Protection and Aordable Care Act,
PPACA) have the potential to signicantly aect employment among the low-wage
population. On the one hand, increased Medicaid eligibility and newly established
health insurance subsidies will reduce the incentive to seek health insurance through
employment. On the other hand, expanding the income cutos for eligibility will
remove work disincentives for individuals who currently refrain from working to
stay eligible for Medicaid. The eects of this law on work incentives for those
marginally attached to the workforce are therefore ambiguous. At the same time,
this population is important for policymakers because of its vulnerability and relative
poverty.
In this paper, I aim to determine the work incentive eects of the PPACA
provisions that apply specically to single mothers, a group that is characterized
by low attachment to the labor force and will be particularly aected by these
reforms. Single mothers and their children are also the main recipients of existing
Medicaid benets. In contrast to married women, they are not able to obtain health
insurance coverage through the employer of their spouse. Moreover, they often lack
the qualications necessary to nd a job with employer-sponsored health insurance
(ESHI).1
I estimate a structural model of labor supply that incorporates Medicaid and
ESHI. In estimating the model, I rely on exogenous variation in recent expansions
of Medicaid eligibility. After obtaining estimates of the preference parameters gov-
erning employment choice, I use them to simulate single mothers' labor supply and
take-up of ESHI under health care reform. The structural approach allows me to
analyze the eects of health insurance subsidies, a policy that has not yet been in-
troduced at the national level.2 This approach therefore constitutes an example of
ex ante policy variation (Wolpin, 2013). In particular, I combine structural estima-
tion with existing policy variation to evaluate a new policy that was only recently
introduced and has not generated enough outcome data yet.
The existing literature on the eects of Medicaid on the labor supply of single
mothers provides mixed evidence. Using data from the 1980s, Blank (1989) and
Winkler (1991) nd weak or no signicant eects. Decker and Selck (2012) and
Strumpf (2011) use variation generated by states introducing Medicaid in the 1960s
and early 1970s and also nd no impact on labor force participation. Meyer and
1With 13.1 million female-headed families with own children (U.S. Census Bureau, 2013), single
mothers are also a quantitatively important group.
2The only other papers to directly estimate the labor market eects of PPACA use a general
equilibrium approach, but do not include Medicaid expansions or an intensive margin, and their
focus is not on single mothers (Aizawa and Fang, 2013; Brugemann and Manovskii, 2010). Another
approach is to use local health care reforms that share some features with PPACA to estimate the
employment eects of changes in health insurance availability. Examples include Colla, Dow, and
Dube (2013) who use the employer mandate in San Francisco and Kolstad and Kowalski (2012)
who exploit the Massachusetts reform. Finkelstein et al. (2012) analyze the Medicaid experiment
carried out in Oregon, but do not consider labor market outcomes.
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Rosenbaum (2001) compare the labor supply eects of dierent welfare programs
and nd that Medicaid has a relatively small positive eect compared to tax in-
centives. Mott and Wolfe (1992) and Dave et al. (2011) estimate that Medicaid
lowers labor supply among women with large medical needs and pregnant women,
respectively. In contrast, Yelowitz (1995) nds that increased Medicaid eligibility
in the late 1980s and early 1990s reduced work disincentives and led to an increase
in labor force participation, but Ham and Shore-Sheppard (2005) refute this result.
In a recent paper, Garthwaite, Gross, and Notowidigdo (2013) analyze the eects
of Medicaid disenrollment in Tennessee and nd a substantial increase in labor sup-
ply among aected individuals. In contrast to my paper, these studies employ a
reduced-form approach, mostly consider the labor force participation decision, and
do not treat ESHI coverage as a choice variables.
I model take-up of ESHI jointly with the labor supply decision and let both
depend on Medicaid availability, while the literature on health insurance and labor
supply considers Medicaid and ESHI separately.3 Potential ESHI coverage, however,
may aect the direction of the employment eect of Medicaid. On the one hand,
many low-income individuals are not qualied for jobs that provide health bene-
ts. Moreover, they are only eligible for Medicaid if their income falls below the
relevant threshold, which induces work disincentives. Expanding Medicaid eligibil-
ity or introducing health insurance subsidies relaxes this constraint and potentially
increases labor supply. On the other hand, if the income threshold increases su-
ciently, workers with ESHI coverage may become eligible for Medicaid or subsidies.
If these alternatives are cheaper or more generous than ESHI, PPACA may lead to
crowding-out of ESHI.4,5 However, none of the existing studies treats ESHI coverage
explicitly as a choice variable, although about a third of single mothers are covered
by ESHI (Yelowitz, 1995).6
While the studies cited above mostly consider the participation decision, this
paper allows for both full-time and part-time employment.7 As I argue in the
previous paragraph, workers with low initial labor supply may increase their hours
when the Medicaid eligibility threshold increases. Others might work full-time prior
to health care reform in order to qualify for ESHI coverage. Introducing health
insurance subsidies allows these individuals to reduce their labor supply and drop
ESHI coverage while obtaining subsidized health insurance. Therefore, not allowing
for an intensive margin would mask these changes in labor supply and would also
3Currie and Madrian (1999), Gruber (2000), and Gruber and Madrian (2002) survey studies in
both areas.
4For example, Cutler and Gruber (1996) estimate crowding-out of ESHI of about 30 to 50
percent due to Medicaid expansions.
5Medicaid expansions may also reduce job lock. Workers who hold a job that is not an ideal
match only to obtain ESHI coverage may be able to switch to a more productive match if they
become eligible for Medicaid (Hamersma and Kim, 2009).
6Mott and Wolfe (1992) and Meyer and Rosenbaum (2000) account for ESHI benets, but
assume that all workers are covered instead of treating ESHI coverage as the individual's choice.
7The studies by Keane and Mott (1998) on the eects of dierent welfare programs on labor
supply and by Buchmueller and Valletta (1999) on the impact of ESHI on the labor supply of
married women allow for an intensive margin, but their focus is not on Medicaid.
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explain why existing studies nd that Medicaid expansions have only small average
eects on labor supply.
I also contribute to the literature by allowing individuals to dier in how much
they value health insurance. Most prior studies on health insurance and labor
market outcomes do not explicitly account for heterogeneity in the demand for
health insurance coverage. By contrast, I allow the demand for health insurance
to vary with individual health. For example, a healthy person might change her
behavior less in response to Medicaid expansions than someone with chronic medical
conditions that require expensive health care. To address individual valuation of
health insurance coverage, Mott and Wolfe (1992), Keane and Mott (1998),
and Aizawa and Fang (2013) match data on health expenditures and labor market
outcomes from two dierent sources. In contrast, the data I use contain information
on both, which makes matching unnecessary.
To estimate the model of labor supply, I draw on changes in Medicaid policies
after the 1996 welfare reforms, a source of identifying variation that almost no study
has used.8 These expansions mostly aected parents while earlier expansions only
increased the eligibility of children and pregnant women. States gained the opportu-
nity to increase parental Medicaid eligibility beyond federal minimum requirements,
thereby introducing more variation. Since PPACA extends Medicaid eligibility to
even broader groups, the analysis of the more current Medicaid expansions is of
particular policy interest. Moreover, this variation allows for more realistic policy
simulations since some states already have Medicaid thresholds that are as high as
the one specied by health care reform.
Hence, my contributions are fourfold. I treat Medicaid and ESHI coverage in a
unied framework and distinguish between full-time and part-time work. Moreover,
I allow for heterogeneity in individuals' valuation of health insurance and use data
on recent policy changes.
The estimated preference parameters indicate that single mothers with medical
conditions are signicantly more likely not to work or to work part-time in order
to be eligible for Medicaid. Hence, these women benet particularly from PPACA
since it allows them to enter the labor force or to work in full-time jobs while re-
ceiving subsidized health insurance. The simulation results show that health care
reform increases labor force participation among single mothers by about six per-
cent. Moreover, labor supply at the intensive margin grows by about ve percent.
These results are consistent with predictions of the Congressional Budget Oce
(2014) for low-income parents. Finally, health care reform leads to crowding-out
of ESHI of about 40 percent in this population. These results are heterogeneous
across subgroups, however, with single mothers with medical conditions reacting
most strongly to the reform, as expected based on the preference parameter esti-
mates. The welfare implications of the reform are positive. On average, families gain
$190 per month from PPACA while the costs associated with the reform amount to
about $150.
8To date, there are three papers exploiting the post-1996 Medicaid expansions (Hamersma and
Kim, 2009, 2013; Hamersma, 2013)
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The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I describe current Medicaid
policies and the relevant provisions of the recent health care reform. I develop a
labor supply model with health insurance in Section 3. Then I discuss my estimation
strategy in Section 4 and describe the data used in the estimation in Section 5.
Section 6 contains the estimation results and in Section 7, I develop theoretical
predictions for the employment eects of PPACA and discuss the policy simulation
results. Finally, Section 8 concludes.
2 Policy Background
In this section, I describe the relevant policy background on Medicaid and PPACA.
I also highlight how variation in existing Medicaid rules helps to identify the labor
supply eects of health care reform and explain the advantages and limitations of
focusing the analysis on single mothers.
2.1 Current Medicaid Policies
Medicaid is the largest public health insurance program for working-age adults and
children in the US, currently providing virtually free health care to 31.5 million
children and 15.5 million parents in low-income households.9 States administer
their own Medicaid programs under broad guidelines set forth by the Centers for
Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS). In particular, each state can expand upon
the minimum levels of Medicaid eligibility that are dened by the CMS (Iglehart,
1999). Therefore, the rules governing eligibility vary considerably between states.
The CMS mandates coverage of a broad range of services, such as hospital stays,
physician care, laboratory and radiographic services, and preventive services (Igle-
hart, 1999). Federal law also prohibits excluding preexisting conditions or imposing
waiting periods for coverage (Rosenbaum, 2002). There is also almost no cost shar-
ing. On the other hand, physician reimbursement is lower for Medicaid patients
than for those covered by private health insurance.10 Therefore medical providers
are less willing to treat Medicaid patients with over one third of physicians in small
private practices not accepting Medicaid patients in 2005 (Iglehart, 2007). Hence
Medicaid provides more generous health care coverage, but restricts health care ac-
cess compared to private health plans. These features of Medicaid translate into the
model assumption that Medicaid and ESHI are perfect substitutes (see Section 3).
Historically, Medicaid eligibility was tied to welfare receipt. A series of reforms
has weakened the link between Medicaid and welfare, rst for children and pregnant
women starting in the mid-1980s and continuing for parents in the mid-1990s. In
particular, the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
9Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Medicare & Medicaid Statistical Supplement
2012 Edition, https://www. cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-
Reports/ MedicareMedicaidStatSupp/2012.html, Table 13.4.
10For example, Zuckerman, Williams, and Stockley (2009) nd that Medicaid reimbursement
rates are on average 30 percent lower than Medicare rates.
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Act (PRWORA) enabled states to set Medicaid eligibility thresholds for parents
independent of welfare rules. In this paper, I focus on the post-1996 changes in
Medicaid eligibility. The eligibility thresholds for parental Medicaid in the post-
1996 period are higher and therefore more comparable to the Medicaid threshold
enacted by health care reform (see Section 2.2).
Children, parents, and pregnant women are eligible for Medicaid if family income
falls below a threshold that varies by state.11 These thresholds are often expressed
as a percentage of the federal poverty line (FPL), which varies with family size.
Federal regulation ensures that children and pregnant women are eligible if family
income falls below 133 percent of the FPL. In contrast, there is no federal minimum
level for parental Medicaid (Rosenbaum, 2009).12
This income test for Medicaid eligibility induces work disincentives. Families
whose income exceeds the respective threshold by only one dollar lose eligibility.
Since Medicaid is currently the only available source of public health insurance and
ESHI is often not oered to low-wage workers, this means that most individuals are
uninsured when they become ineligible for Medicaid. The sharp drop in benets
is also known as the Medicaid \notch" (Yelowitz, 1995). This \notch" leads to a
strong incentive to reduce labor supply in order to keep earnings below the pertinent
threshold. State specic income thresholds determine by how much parents have to
reduce their labor supply to stay or become eligible for Medicaid.
Many states have used the increased opportunity to increase Medicaid thresh-
olds above the minimum requirements after 1996. Figure 1 shows a histogram of
population weighted parental Medicaid thresholds for a family of three for the years
1996 to 2007 in all states.13 The graph illustrates the variation I use to identify the
labor supply response to changes in Medicaid eligibility. There is variation in the
income eligibility threshold for parental Medicaid across states and within states
across time. Hence, I can compare single mothers residing in dierent states at
dierent points in time and attribute dierences in labor supply to dierences in
Medicaid eligibility conditional on other observables. I further discuss the identi-
cation strategy in Section 4.4.
11Prior to PPACA, childless adults were never eligible for Medicaid in most states. See Section
2.2 on changes in Medicaid eligibility through PPACA.
12In addition to income thresholds, asset tests were prevalent in determining Medicaid eligibility,
but have been abolished in many states in recent years in an eort to simplify the application
process. In 2009, 46 states did not require asset tests for children and 23 did not require them for
parental Medicaid (Cohen Ross and Marks, 2009). Since there is no information on households'
assets in the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, the data set used in this paper, I ignore asset tests
for Medicaid eligibility completely. This is a reasonable simplication, in particular for children's
Medicaid.
13I am grateful to Sarah Hamersma for sharing state-level eligibility thresholds for parental
Medicaid with me. See Hamersma and Kim (2009) for a complete list of Medicaid thresholds and
their changes over time.
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Figure 1: Distribution of Eligibility Thresholds for Parental Medicaid
2.2 The Patient Protection and Aordable Care Act
The components of the PPACA, which President Obama signed into law on March
23, 2010, can be classied into two major categories. First, it requires individuals
to obtain health insurance coverage (individual mandate) and rms to provide it to
their employees (employer mandate).14 Second, it substantially expands Medicaid
eligibility and provides health insurance subsidies to help low-income individuals
comply with the insurance mandate. In this section, I focus on Medicaid expansions
and subsidies since I simulate the eects of these provisions only.
In contrast to current Medicaid rules, citizens and legal residents below the age
of 65 will be eligible for Medicaid starting in 2014, provided that family income does
not exceed 138 percent of the FPL.15,16 Childless individuals, who are not eligible
for Medicaid under current rules, gain access to public health insurance through
this expansion. In addition, the new law amounts to an eligibility expansion for
parents in 38 states and older children in 26 states (Rosenbaum, 2009; Cohen Ross
and Marks, 2009). PPACA also abolishes asset tests in the states where they are
currently applied. States that had Medicaid thresholds above 133 percent of the
FPL in place in March 2010 cannot lower them before 2014 and 2019 for adults and
children, respectively.
Since childless adults will experience the largest increase in Medicaid availability,
it is important to analyze how they change their labor supply in response to this
14Both individuals and rms have the option to pay penalties if they do not take up and provide
health insurance, respectively.
15The ocial threshold will be 133 percent of the FPL, but there is a special adjustment of ve
percentage points, which eectively brings the threshold to 138 percent (Kaiser Family Foundation,
2010a).
16In 2013, 138 percent of the FPL amounts to about $27,000 for a family of three.
7
reform (Kenney et al., 2012).17 However, these individuals are currently not eligible
for Medicaid irrespective of their income. Since eligibility does not vary in this group,
it is dicult to estimate the eect of Medicaid expansions on the labor supply of
childless individuals and to simulate their employment choices under health care
reform. Childless individuals also make dierent employment decisions than single
mothers so that I cannot extrapolate from the latter to the former.
Moreover, single mothers are an important group when it comes to Medicaid and
its eects on labor supply. Since they are not able to obtain health insurance through
a spouse, they rely more heavily on public health insurance options and are at a
greater risk of being uninsured than married women. Therefore it is particularly
policy relevant to analyze whether single mothers increase or reduce their labor
supply due to health care reform.
Figure 1 shows that few states have thresholds above 138 percent of the FPL.18
This implies, however, that the current variation in the data includes the new Med-
icaid threshold. Predicting employment choice under health care reform with this
data will consequently not be completely out-of-sample.
In addition to expanding Medicaid eligibility, PPACA introduces subsidies for
individuals who earn up to 400 percent of the FPL.19 Individuals whose income falls
below this threshold can purchase coverage on newly established Health Benet
Exchanges at premiums that are limited to a percentage of their income. The
highest income percentages that individuals have to pay for their coverage increase
on a sliding scale as shown in Table 1. Subsidized health plans are limited to the
silver plan with the second lowest cost in each state.20 Moreover, these subsidies are
not available to individuals whose employers oer ESHI. Since PPACA introduces
subsidized health insurance for individuals and families in a wide range of the income
distribution, this reform constitutes a substantial policy change. No similar policy
exists on the national level, so simulating employment choice in the presence of
health insurance subsidies requires structural estimation.
Immediately after President Obama signed the PPACA into law, several states
started to challenge some of its components legally. In particular, these states argued
that the individual mandate and the Medicaid expansions were unconstitutional.
In 2012, the Supreme Court upheld the individual mandate, but struck down the
Medicaid expansion being mandatory for states. In particular, Medicaid eligibility
will still increase to 138 percent of the FPL in 2014, but states can opt out of this
provision (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2012). However, the individual mandate and
health insurance subsidies remain valid, and states will have to implement health
insurance exchanges.
17For example, DeLeire et al. (2013) show that childless adults benet from a Medicaid expansion
in Wisconsin by increasing their health care utilization.
18Among the most populous states, some have Medicaid thresholds above 138 percent. For
example, the thresholds in California and New York are around 150 percent of the FPL.
19For a family of three, 400 percent of the FPL is about $78,000.
20Health plans that are available on Health Benet Exchanges are classied into bronze, silver,
gold, and platinum plans according to their cost sharing. Silver plans cover essential health benets
and cover 70 percent of costs.
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Table 1: Health Insurance Subsidies Under PPACA
Income range as HI premium limit as
percent of FPL percent of income
100 { 133 2
133 { 150 3 { 4
150 { 200 4 { 6.3
200 { 250 6.3 { 8.05
250 { 300 8.05 { 9.5
300 { 400 9.5
Notes: FPL = federal poverty level.
Source: Kaiser Family Foundation (2010b).
Policy makers are aware that PPACA has important consequences for the labor
market. The Congressional Budget Oce (2014) estimates, for instance, that health
care reform will lead to an overall decrease in labor supply by about 2.0 million full-
time equivalent workers by 2017. The most important components of the PPACA
that are responsible for this decline in labor supply are health insurance subsidies,
Medicaid expansions, employer penalties, and new taxes on earnings, according to
the Congressional Budget Oce (2014). In particular, the report argues that health
insurance subsidies act as an implicit tax on earnings and therefore lead to reduced
labor supply. In addition, childless adults in states that expand Medicaid have an
incentive to work less in order to become eligible (see also Garthwaite, Gross, and
Notowidigdo, 2013). On the other hand, the CBO argues that low-income parents
who were eligible for Medicaid before the reform are likely to increase their labor
supply. This prediction is in line with both the theoretical predictions and the
empirical results of the present paper (see Section 7.1 for a in-depth discussion of
the potential labor supply eects of PPACA). However, in contrast to the present
paper, the CBO does not provide a model or quantify the labor supply eect among
single mothers.
3 Theoretical Model
In this section, I develop a discrete static model of labor supply with ESHI and
Medicaid. The model serves as a framework for estimating and simulating the
impact of Medicaid expansions on the labor supply of single mothers.
Single mothers face a static labor supply decision.21,22 Each period, they receive
21Single mothers are more likely to be liquidity constrained than married women and have small
returns to work experience. Therefore, existing studies use a static approach when modeling single
mothers' labor supply (Keane, 2011, p. 1070).
22Although the model is static, I use panel data to estimate it. Therefore, the time subscript t
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three job oers, which are characterized by hours worked, a wage, and whether
or not the job includes health benets.23 They can choose between one part-time
oer and two full-time oers, one of which includes ESHI. Health benets are not
available for part-time jobs since most employers do not oer ESHI to their part-
time workers. Weekly hours are 20 for part-time jobs and 40 for full-time jobs. The
oered wage may dier by employment alternative. If a woman does not accept any
of the three oers, she does not work for that period.
Individuals derive utility from per capita consumption, leisure (disutility from
hours worked), and health insurance coverage for themselves and their children.
Hence, utility of individual i in time period t when choosing either non-work (j = n),
part-time employment (j = p), full-time employment without ESHI (j = f0), or full-
time employment with ESHI (j = f1) is
Uitj = U

~Citj ;Hitj ; I
P
itj ; I
K
itj ;Z
u
i

, (1)
where ~Citj is per capita consumption,
24 Hitj = f0; 20; 40g is hours worked, and IPitj
and IKitj are indicators for mothers' (indicated by P as in parental) and children's
(K as in kids) health insurance coverage, respectively. Zui is a vector of individual
characteristics that do not change over time and aect preferences. The goal of the
estimation procedure laid out in Section 4 is to obtain the parameters of the utility
function, which will allow me to carry out policy simulations.
The family's budget constraint is
Citj + E
P
itj + E
K
itj + premitI
S
itj = witjHitj + Tit (witjHitj) , (2)
where EPitj and E
K
itj are out-of-pocket medical expenditure of the mother and her
children, respectively, premit is the part of the ESHI premium paid by the employee
if she obtains ESHI coverage (ISitj = 1), witj is the wage in alternative j, and
Tit (witjHitj) is the sum of government transfers (welfare, food stamps, payroll and
income taxes, and the Earned Income Tax Credit) as a function of earnings. Each
period individuals choose the alternative that yields the highest utility according to
the utility function (1) subject to the budget constraint (2).
Single mothers value health insurance because it reduces out-of-pocket medical
expenditures. Beyond that, individuals also directly derive utility from health in-
surance since it has a positive eect on health and reduces a family's nancial risk.
I assume that the two sources for health insurance coverage, ESHI and Medicaid
(IM;hitj ; h = P;K), are perfect substitutes in the utility function:
Ihitj = max
n
ISitj ; I
M;h
itj
o
; h = P;K. (3)
appears throughout this section.
23I do not model the probability of receiving an oer. However, the demand side of the labor
market enters the model through the wage equation (6) below.
24Since there are economies of scale in consumption, I use an equivalence scale of the form
~Citj = Citj=(1 +
p
NKit), where Citj is total family consumption and NKit is the number of
children.
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Medical services covered by ESHI and Medicaid are roughly comparable. Medicaid
covers services that may be not available under some low-cost ESHI plans. On
the other hand, Medicaid reduces access to health care due to lower provider reim-
bursement rates (see Section 2.1). In the only other structural study in this area,
Keane and Mott (1998, p. 570) estimate separate utility parameters for Medicaid
and ESHI, but they are not statistically signicant from each other. Therefore, the
simplifying assumption implied by equation (3) is reasonable.
Mothers and their children are covered by ESHI if the mother works full-time
with health benets, i.e. ISitj = 1 fj = f1g. I assume that mothers who work full-time
with ESHI coverage obtain health benets for both themselves and their children.
In contrast, Medicaid coverage of mothers and children may dier due to dierences
in eligibility thresholds.
Medicaid coverage depends on eligibility thresholds that vary by state of resi-
dence, year, family size, and a child's age. Mothers and children are eligible if family
income is less than the relevant income threshold. Ignoring unearned income, the
eligibility rule for mothers is
IM;Pitj = 1
n
witjHitj MPs(i)t
o
, (4)
where MPs(i)t is the eligibility threshold for parental Medicaid according to state of
residence s, year, and family size and witjHitj is monthly earnings.
25 For children,
eligibility is determined separately for each age group. Let a index age groups and
Nait be the number of children in age group a of mother i at time t. Then, a summary
measure for children's Medicaid eligibility is
IM;Kitj =
1P
aN
a
it
X
a
Nait1
n
witjHitj MK;as(i)t
o
; (5)
where MK;as(i)t is the Medicaid eligibility threshold for age group a. Hence I
M;K
itj 2
[0; 1].26
The above model implies that mothers take up Medicaid coverage for themselves
or their children whenever eligible. This seems to be an unrealistic assumption
given the evidence for relatively low take-up rates (e.g., Shore-Sheppard, 2008).27
25Medicaid eligibility depends on income, which includes unearned income other than welfare
and food stamp payments. However, since I do not observe these income sources in the data, I am
forced to make the simplifying assumption that unearned income equals zero.
26Therefore, IM;Kitj is not an indicator variable but can take on values on the unit interval. It is a
summary measure that represents the fraction of children in a family who are eligible for Medicaid.
Using this variable implies that mothers only care about the fraction of their children who are
covered by health insurance and not about any particular child being covered. By including the
fraction of children covered by health insurance in the utility function instead of their number, I
can compare single mothers with dierent numbers of children.
27On the other hand, evidence from administrative data shows that take-up rates for Medicaid
are higher than usually estimated based on survey data. Card, Hildreth, and Shore-Sheppard (2004)
nd that about 15 percent of individuals who are covered by Medicaid according to administrative
data do not report coverage in the Survey of Income and Program Participation.
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However, health care providers can sign up eligible patients for Medicaid and have
the incentive to do so if the patient cannot pay for treatment herself. I also abstract
from Medicaid stigma. Some studies including Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001) and
Keane and Mott (1998) allow for a cost of signing up for Medicaid or welfare
benets. However, Medicaid coverage is less visible than welfare receipt, which
reduces the importance of stigma. The cost of signing up is also small if health care
providers take care of it. Moreover, the goal of this paper is to simulate employment
choice under health care reform which includes a health insurance mandate. This
mandate is expected to increase take-up of Medicaid.
In addition to the utility function and budget constraint, the model species
equations for wage and out-of-pocket medical expenditure. The wage is determined
by the wage equation
witj = exp

~wj
 
Zwit ; u
w
itj

, (6)
where ~wj() is a log-wage function and Zwit contains worker and labor market char-
acteristics. The error term uwitj diers by employment alternatives to capture unob-
served dierences between job oers.
The out-of-pocket medical expenditure equations for mothers and children are:
Ehitj = E
h

ISitj ; I
M;h
itj ; Z
E;h
it ; u
E;h
it

; h = P;K, (7)
where ISitj and I
M;h
itj are indicators for ESHI and Medicaid coverage, and Z
E;h
it con-
tains individual characteristics such as medical conditions. The expenditure shocks
uE;hit are the same for all alternatives for a given individual and time period. Out-
of-pocket medical expenditure can vary across alternatives, however, since Medicaid
and ESHI coverage are alternative specic and aect Ehitj . Since I allow out-of-
pocket medical expenditure to vary with health insurance status, I implicitly allow
for ex post moral hazard. That is, having insurance coverage may aect medical
expenditure conditional on having a medical condition. I assume that there is no
ex ante moral hazard however. Hence, I take medical conditions as exogenous and
assume that they do not depend on health insurance status.28
4 Estimation Strategy
The model described in the previous section consists of four equations: the utility
function (1), a wage equation (6), and two equations for the out-of-pocket medical
expenditure of mothers and children (7) (and implicitly the budget constraint (2)).
In this section, I describe the three-step estimation procedure that I use to obtain
the parameters of these equations. First, I estimate a multinomial logit model of
employment choice to generate selection correction terms. Second, I estimate wage
28If there is ex ante moral hazard, health insurance could aect medical conditions when insured
individuals reduce preventive eorts, for example. This assumption is in line with the empirical
evidence reviewed by Zweifel and Manning (2000). There is strong evidence for ex post moral
hazard while evidence for ex ante moral hazard is limited.
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and medical expenditure equations in order to produce conditional distributions of
these variables, which enter the utility function as arguments. Third, I estimate
preference parameters using a structural multinomial logit model. I also briey
discuss identication of the model parameters at the end of this section.
4.1 Step 1: Selection Correction
Observed wages and medical expenditure depend on the chosen employment alterna-
tive. Wages are not observed for nonworking single mothers. Wages may also dier
between full-time and part-time jobs and between jobs with and without ESHI.
In addition, medical expenditures of mothers and children are a function of Medi-
caid and ESHI coverage, which in turn are determined by the mother's employment
choice. Therefore, it is necessary to control for selection when estimating the wage
and expenditure equations. I use a nonparametric multivariate selection correction
procedure developed by Dahl (2002), which accounts for multiple choice alternatives
and is both exible and simple.
In particular, Dahl (2002) shows that it is sucient to include a nonparametric
function of the predicted choice probabilities, f (p^), in the outcome equation to con-
trol for selection. To obtain predicted choice probabilities, I estimate a multinomial
logit model of employment choice, where choice is a function of individual charac-
teristics and state-level Medicaid thresholds.29 Utility from employment alternative
j = n; p; f0; f1 is
U1itj = X
10
itj + itj ,
where X1it is a vector of individual and state-level characteristics, and itj is an
extreme-value error term. As a normalization, n = 0. Single mothers choose the
employment alternative j if j = argmaxk U
1
itk. Then the selection correction terms
are a function of predicted choice probabilities, f (p^itj), where
p^itj =
X10it ^j
1 +
P
k=p;f0;f1
X10it ^k
; f = p; f0; f1 and p^itn =
1
1 +
P
k=p;f0;f1
X10it ^k
In practice, f (p^itj) is a fourth-order polynomial in the predicted choice probabilities.
4.2 Step 2: Wage and Medical Expenditure Equations
I estimate the parameters of the wage and expenditure equations to obtain the
conditional distributions of wages and medical expenditures in all employment al-
ternatives. Since earnings and medical expenditure are only observed for the chosen
alternative, I draw counterfactuals for the other alternatives from these conditional
distributions. Earnings determine Medicaid eligibility and transfers, so these simu-
lations yield all the components that enter the utility function as arguments.30
29This \reduced-form" multinomial logit is dierent from the structural multinomial logit used
to estimate the distribution of preference parameters in step 3 of the estimation procedure.
30Simulation of the utility arguments is necessary since they enter the choice probabilities non-
linearly. In other words, I have to integrate out the wage and expenditures to obtain choice proba-
bilities, and I approximate this integration by drawing from the respective conditional distributions.
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Wages may dier across employment alternatives. Part-time workers usually
earn lower wages than full-time workers, and rms oering ESHI pay lower wages,
all else equal (compensating wage dierential). Therefore, I estimate separate wage
equations for the three employment alternatives part-time and full-time without and
with ESHI as the empirical counterpart for equation (6) in the theoretical model as
follows:
logwitj = X
w0
it 
w
j + f (p^itj) + 
w
s(i)j + 
w
itj , (8)
where Xwit is a vector of individual characteristics and 
w
s(i)j is a state xed eect.
The state xed eects capture state-specic characteristics other than the state
unemployment rate and minimum wage (which are included in Xwit ). The selection
correction function in regression f (p^itj) only includes the predicted probabilities for
alternative j, which is sucient to control for selection into that alternative (Dahl,
2002).
Using the estimated parameters in equation (8), I predict wages for the three
employment alternatives for all single mothers in the sample. That is, independent
of the chosen alternative (including non-work), each single mother is associated with
three predicted wages. The predicted wages and hours worked determine monthly
earnings for all employment alternatives. Hours worked H^itj are either the observed
number for the chosen alternative or 20 and 40 for part-time and full-time employ-
ment, respectively. Given predicted and observed earnings for all alternatives, I
simulate government transfers (denoted by T

w^
(r)
itj H^itj

) and Medicaid eligibility
for mothers and children (denoted by I^M;Pitj and I^
M;K
itj , respectively). I calculate
transfers as the sum of welfare benets (TANF), food stamps, and the Earned In-
come Tax Credit (EITC) and subtracting federal income and payroll taxes.31
The out-of-pocket medical expenditure regressions for mothers and children cor-
respond to equation (7) in the theoretical model. Out-of-pocket expenditures are
a function of health insurance coverage (Medicaid and ESHI) and other individual
characteristics. Based on predicted Medicaid coverage, I^M;Pitj and I^
M;K
itj , and ESHI
coverage ISitj = 1 fj = f1g, I use these estimates to simulate mothers' and children's
out-of-pocket medical expenditures under the four employment and health insur-
ance coverage alternatives. Hence, I use variation in Medicaid thresholds across
states and time in order to estimate the eect of Medicaid coverage on medical
expenditure.
To account for the high fraction of zeros and the skewness in the expenditure
distribution, I estimate two-part models for mothers' and children's out-of-pocket
expenditure following, e.g., Mullahy (1998) and Aizawa and Fang (2013). In the
rst part, I estimate a probit for medical expenditure exceeding zero and in the
second part, I use a log-transformation of strictly positive expenditure. Hence, the
31Equations (4) and (5) in Section 3 describe the construction of the Medicaid eligibility variables.
The online appendix contains details about these programs and the rules used to calculate transfers
given monthly earnings.
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two-part model consists of the following two equations:
Pr

Ehit > 0

= 

Zh0it 
h + f (p^itj) + 
h;1
s(i)

(9)
ln

Ehit

jEhit > 0 = Zh0it h + f (p^itj) + h;2s(i) + uh;2it ; h = P;K (10)
for mothers (h = P ) and children (h = K), where EPit is a mothers' annual out-of-
pocket medical expenditure and EKit is the sum of expenditures for her children.
32
ZPit and Z
K
it contain demographics, the number of medical conditions, Medicaid
eligibility of mothers and children, and ESHI coverage.33 Medicaid eligibility is
based on simulated earnings (I^M;Pitj and I^
M;K
itj , see above). 
h;1
s(i) and 
h;2
s(i) are state
xed eects and uh;2it ; h = P;K is a normally distributed time specic expenditure
shock.
As with the wage equation, observed medical expenditures depend on the chosen
employment alternative since they are a function of Medicaid and ESHI coverage.
However, since I consider only out-of-pocket expenditure, it is not clear if ESHI sta-
tus and unobserved determinants of medical expenditure are positively or negatively
related. Being covered by ESHI may lead to lower out-of-pocket expenditure condi-
tional on observables since the health insurance plan pays for medical care. On the
other hand, individuals who are covered by ESHI may have an overall higher need
for medical care, so that even their out-of-pocket expenditure is higher. Moreover,
Medicaid covers most medical expenditures, so single mothers who are covered by
Medicaid are likely to have lower out-of-pocket spending. To deal with this issue, I
use the same selection correction procedure as above, i.e. I include a function of the
predicted choice probabilities from the rst-step multinomial logit, f (p^itj).
Based on the estimated coecients in equations (9) and (10) and given the
functional form assumptions of the two-part model, I simulate out-of-pocket medi-
cal expenditures E^Pitj and E^
K
itj for all four employment alternatives. The simulated
out-of-pocket medical expenditures for mothers and children, respectively, for em-
ployment alternatives without ESHI coverage are
E^hitj = 

Zh0it ^
h;1 + df (p^itj) expZh0it ^h;2 + df (p^itj) + uh;2it  ; h = P;K, (11)
where uh;2it is a draws from N

0; ^2h;2

, and ^2h;2 is the estimated variance of the
error term uh;2it .
Having obtained simulated earnings, Medicaid eligibility, and medical expendi-
tures, all arguments of the utility function (consumption, hours worked, and health
insurance) are available, and I can estimate preference parameters in the third step.
32Out-of-pocket medical expenditures are health care expenditures incurred by the family, i.e.
both cost sharing (deductibles and copayments) for insured individuals and medical expenditures
paid for uninsured family members, or the cost of medical services not covered by health insurance.
They do not include health insurance premiums.
33The medical conditions include long-term life threatening conditions, such as cancer, hyper-
tension, and stroke; chronic, manageable conditions such as asthma and back problems; and mental
health issues.
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4.3 Step 3: Employment and Health Insurance Choice
Since employment choice is discrete, I estimate the parameters of the utility func-
tion (1) by multinomial logit.34 Instead of imposing xed preference parameters,
I allow for both observed and unobserved heterogeneity in preferences. Using the
conditional distributions of wages and medical expenditures estimated above, I sim-
ulate earnings and expenditures based on simulation draws of wage and expenditure
shocks. Having simulated earnings and medical expenditures, all required compo-
nents are available to obtain the utility arguments per-capita consumption ( ~^Citj),
hours worked (Hitj), and health insurance coverage (I^
P
itj for mothers and I^
K
itj for
children) for all four employment alternatives. The utility function is linear in its
arguments. Consumption and health insurance coverage depend on simulated earn-
ings and out-of-pocket medical expenditure, so I calculate utility for each simulation
draw r as:
U
(r)
itj = 
C ~C
(r)
itj + 
H
i
~Hitj + 
P
i I^
P;(r)
itj + 
K
i I^
K;(r)
itj + j + itj (12)
= u
(r)
itj + itj ,
where itj is extreme value type I distributed. While marginal utility from consump-
tion, C , is assumed to be constant across individuals, the remaining preference
parameters (Hi ; 
P
i ; 
K
i ) are individual specic. The parameters j ; j = n; p; f0; f1
are alternative specic constants that allow a better t of the choice proportions in
the data (van Soest, 1995), and n = 0 as a normalization.
Given the budget constraint (2) and the scale assumption (see footnote 24), I
calculate real per capita monthly consumption in 1,000 1996 dollars as
~C
(r)
itj =
1
1000
 
1 +
p
NKit

CPI96t

12
52
w
(r)
itjHitj + T

12
52
w
(r)
itjHitj

 
premitj + E
P;(r)
itj +E
K;(r)
itj
12
#
(13)
where NKit is number of children, CPI
96
t is the price index for the base year 1996
used to obtain real values, and premitj is the part of the annual health insurance
premium paid by the individual.35 In the estimation, a premium is only required for
ESHI. When I simulate employment choice under health care reform, however, indi-
viduals also pay premiums for subsidized health insurance according to the schedule
in Table 1. I normalize hours worked as ~Hitj = Hitj=40, where Hitj is observed
hours worked, or 20 or 40 depending on the employment alternative. I
P;(r)
itj and
34Zabalza, Pissarides, and Barton (1980), Fraker and Mott (1988), and van Soest (1995) are
early examples for discretizing the hours distribution in estimating labor supply models. Keane
and Mott (1998) and Buchmueller and Valletta (1999) use this approach in the context of welfare
programs (including Medicaid) and private health insurance, respectively.
35I take state and year level ESHI premiums from the MEPS Insurance Component (see the
online appendix for details).
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I
K;(r)
itj are calculated according to equations (3), (4), and (5) in Section 3 using
simulated earnings in the Medicaid eligibility rules.
The preference parameters i are correlated coecients that depend on observ-
ables and unobservables as follows:
i  N

Zi ;

, (14)
where Zi is a vector of observables and  is a matrix of coecients.  is an un-
restricted variance-covariance matrix. Zi includes mother's age (aecting 
H
i and
Pi ), indicators for Hispanic and black families (
H
i , 
P
i , and 
K
i ), the number of
children under age four (Hi ), the number of the mother's medical conditions (
P
i ),
and the age of the youngest child and the sum of children's conditions (Ki ). These
variables capture observable characteristics that potentially aect labor supply and
the demand for health insurance. These assumptions lead to a multinomial logit
model with correlated random parameters (mixed logit), where the random com-
ponents are multivariate normally distributed. The parameters  and  of the
preference distribution and the xed preference parameters C and  are estimated
via Maximum Simulated Likelihood. Standard errors of the coecients in all re-
gressions are obtained using block-bootstrap to account for clustering within state
(see details in the online appendix).
4.4 Identication
This section does not contain a formal identication proof, but I provide an intuitive
argument that the parameter vector  =
 
C ; ; ;

is identied. Identication
comes from both quasi-experimental variation in Medicaid eligibility rules and the
structure imposed on the estimation method.36
Medicaid policies and other program rules that dier by state (such as welfare)
are treated as exogenous. Although this is not a perfect experiment, there are many
studies that treat between-state variation as exogenous. Moreover, I use variation
in these policies over time. To account for unobserved state specic variation, I also
include state xed eects into the wage and medical expenditure regressions.
This exogeneity assumption may be violated if individuals choose their location
based on Medicaid generosity. In the context of welfare, Kennan and Walker (2010)
show that individuals do not migrate to a dierent state to take advantage of higher
welfare payments. Another concern is that single mothers may base their marriage
and fertility decisions on Medicaid rules, which vary by family size. This would also
contradict Medicaid rules being exogenous. DeLeire, Lopoo, and Simon (2007) nd
that Medicaid expansions in the 1980s and early 1990s did not have a statistically
signicant eect on fertility. It is therefore unlikely that there was a relationship
between Medicaid and fertility in the later period studied in the present paper.
36Conceptually, the combination of policy variation and structural estimation is similar to papers
that use randomized experiments in conjunction with structural methods (Todd and Wolpin, 2006;
Attanasio, Meghir, and Santiago, 2012; Ferrall, 2012).
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In addition to exploiting exogenous variation in Medicaid policies, I also impose
structure on the estimation that allows me to identify the preference parameters.
In particular, I postulate a linear utility function and assume that the random pref-
erence parameters have a joint normal distribution (see equations (12) and (14)).
Walker, Ben-Akiva, and Bolduc (2007) show that the mean and variance parameters
in a multinomial logit model with random coecients are identied for both contin-
uous and categorical independent variables. In the present case, identication does
not rely solely on exogenous variation in policy parameters and changes in medical
condition or on the imposed structure, but rather on the combination of the two.
5 Data and Summary Statistics
The Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) is a large-scale longitudinal and na-
tionally representative survey of households, their medical providers, and employers
carried out by the Agency of Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ).37 It collects
extensive information on the use of health care, associated expenditures, health in-
surance coverage, and medical conditions. In addition, it contains information of
individuals' labor market outcomes and socio-demographic variables. The MEPS
interviews each household ve times over a period of 2.5 years. It is a rotating
panel and has drawn a new sample every year since its start in 1996. Data for 14
completed panels are available to date (from the 1996 panel to the 2009 panel).
Since the public use version of the MEPS does not include geographic infor-
mation, and estimating the eect of Medicaid policies on labor supply requires
knowledge of individuals' state of residence, this paper uses restricted MEPS data
that is not publicly available. State identiers are encrypted in the restricted use
version, but households are matched to state-level policy variables such as Medicaid
eligibility thresholds and welfare rules.
Although the MEPS interviews each household ve times within two years, some
variables are measured at the annual level. In particular, the MEPS only contains
annual medical expenditure variables. Therefore, I use data from one interview
round for each year so that there are two observations for each household. I choose
rounds 2 and 4 for variables that are measured at the round-level, i.e. all labor
market variables. Rounds 2 and 4 both take place in the middle of the respective
year so that no seasonal adjustments are necessary. To generate the estimation
sample, I pool data from all panels.
To obtain a sample of single mothers, I select female household heads who are
not married and have at least one child under the age of 18. The mothers' age is
restricted to the range 18 to 55. From this sample, I select women who have at
most ve children. This is necessary because Medicaid eligibility thresholds vary
by family size and I only have access to these thresholds for a maximum of six
family members. Single mothers with more than ve children constitute less than
37Data les and documentation are available from http://www.meps.ahrq.gov/mepsweb/data
stats/download data les.jsp.
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one percent of the initial sample. Finally, I drop individuals who reside in states
with fewer than 30 observations over the entire sample period, which leaves single
mothers from 37 states in the estimation sample. Overall, these restrictions yield
an estimation sample consisting of 7,852 single mothers.
Table 2 displays summary statistics for the individual-year-level variables used
in the estimation by observed employment status (not working, part-time, full-time
without ESHI, and full-time with ESHI, where part-time employment as dened
as working less than 35 hours per week). The rst two rows show frequencies and
percentages for each employment category. About one third of year-level observa-
tions fall into the non-working and full-time work with ESHI categories, respectively,
about one fth of the sample work full-time without ESHI, and the remainder is in
part-time work.
Characteristics of single mothers vary between employment alternatives. Women
with full-time work and ESHI coverage are older, less likely to be Hispanic, and
have more education on average. Their hourly wage is higher than that of single
mothers in full-time or part-time jobs without ESHI coverage. Single mothers who
are not employed not only have more children but also younger children than those
working. They are also less healthy on average, measured by the fraction that has
any medical condition and by the average number of conditions. Among working
mothers, those with ESHI coverage have slightly more medical conditions. The
children of non-working mothers are also less healthy on average. Out-of-pocket
medical expenditure for both mothers and children are highest among women with
ESHI coverage. Medicaid is an important source of health insurance coverage for
single parents and their children. Seventy percent of single mothers who do not
work and 85 percent of their children are covered by Medicaid. Over 40 percent of
women working part-time or full-time without ESHI and about 70 percent of their
children are covered by Medicaid. Overall, this sample of single mothers is relatively
poor. Even among women working full-time with ESHI, average income is only 260
percent of the FPL.
Besides individual and family level variables, I merge a number of state-level
variables to the MEPS.38 Table 3 displays summary statistics of these variables. I
obtain these statistics from the sample of single mothers, so they are weighted by
the number of observations in each year-state cell. According to these weighted
means, about 56 percent of rms oer ESHI, and employers pay $3.11 for ESHI per
hour. The employee part of the ESHI premium amounts to about $2,200 per year
for family coverage. The average threshold for parental Medicaid is about $1,000 per
month. This value accounts for the family sizes observed in the sample. For infants,
the Medicaid eligibility thresholds is over $2,300 per month. This number decreases
to about $1,500 for older children. Using the Medicaid threshold under health care
reform with the actual FPL from 1996 to 2010 yields an average eligibility threshold
of $1,700, which is signicantly higher than under current rules.39
38See the online appendix for details and sources.
39I calculate the Medicaid threshold under PPACA using the FPL that was in eect in the years
when the respective individual was part of the sample. Hence, these thresholds are calculated as if
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Table 2: Summary Statistics of Household Characteristics by Observed Employment
Alternative
Non-work Part-time Full-time, Full-time
no ESHI ESHI
Frequency 4940 2650 3126 4647
Percentage 0.322 0.172 0.203 0.302
Mother's age 34.59 34.83 34.37 38.00
(9.06) (8.62) (8.25) (7.72)
Black 0.381 0.342 0.343 0.368
(0.486) (0.475) (0.475) (0.482)
Hispanic 0.351 0.254 0.354 0.202
(0.477) (0.435) (0.478) (0.402)
Years of education 11.05 12.04 11.62 13.17
(2.72) (2.57) (2.56) (2.38)
Number of children 2.121 1.906 1.988 1.661
(1.193) (1.004) (1.053) (0.851)
aged 0 to 2 0.336 0.231 0.234 0.112
(0.576) (0.482) (0.475) (0.336)
aged 3 to 4 0.247 0.213 0.213 0.123
(0.469) (0.435) (0.441) (0.343)
aged 5 to 10 0.726 0.669 0.698 0.533
(0.862) (0.791) (0.804) (0.693)
aged 11 and older 0.812 0.794 0.844 0.893
(0.954) (0.925) (0.932) (0.828)
Age of youngest child 6.88 7.51 7.48 9.53
(5.42) (5.11) (5.14) (5.10)
Any med. cond., mother 0.428 0.353 0.319 0.374
(0.495) (0.478) (0.466) (0.484)
# of med. cond., mother 0.984 0.634 0.530 0.675
(1.630) (1.138) (1.015) (1.163)
Any med. cond., children 0.287 0.239 0.233 0.234
(0.453) (0.427) (0.423) (0.423)
# of med. cond., children 0.520 0.395 0.370 0.367
(1.214) (0.958) (0.896) (0.849)
Med. OOP expenditure, mother 322.51 340.74 252.27 421.92
(1318.34) (1224.30) (649.03) (812.27)
Med. OOP expenditure, children 145.80 197.66 172.83 351.67
(1211.00) (763.98) (619.25) (968.76)
Medicaid coverage, mother 0.692 0.471 0.428 0.051
(0.462) (0.499) (0.495) (0.219)
Medicaid coverage, children 0.855 0.712 0.713 0.251
(0.340) (0.441) (0.442) (0.427)
Hourly wage 9.49 9.10 14.97
(19.81) (4.45) (8.37)
Hours worked 23.69 40.96 41.39
(7.64) (6.57) (5.25)
Income as percentage of FPL 57.32 119.96 128.97 257.55
(68.23) (114.84) (97.72) (157.83)
Notes: Means and standard deviations (in parentheses). OOP = out-of-pocket, FPL = federal
poverty level.
Source: Medical Expenditure Panel Survey.
20
Table 3: Summary Statistics of State-Level Variables
Mean Std.dev.
State unemployment rate 5.199 (1.017)
State minimum wage 5.482 (0.797)
Fractions of rms oering ESHI 0.556 (0.054)
Employee annual ESHI premium 2175.10 (718.00)
Annual federal poverty line 14818.40 (3315.70)
Medicaid eligibility threshold, parents 999.10 (648.50)
Medicaid eligibility threshold, children 0 to 1 2359.40 (674.30)
Medicaid eligibility threshold, children 1 to 5 1897.70 (663.80)
Medicaid eligibility threshold, children 6 to 14 1590.70 (714.70)
Medicaid eligibility threshold, children 15 to 16 1508.60 (792.80)
Medicaid eligibility threshold, children 17 1505.80 (794.80)
Medicaid eligibility threshold, children 18 to 19 1502.60 (797.00)
Medicaid eligibility threshold under PPACA 1704.10 (381.30)
Notes: Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of state-level variables
weighted by number of individual observations per state and year.
Source: See online appendix.
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6 Estimation Results
In this section, I rst show reduced-form evidence on the employment eects of Med-
icaid expansions. Then I discuss the results for the three-step estimator described
in Section 4.
6.1 Reduced-Form Results
To show that Medicaid eligibility thresholds aect single mothers' employment
choice, I regress labor market outcomes on Medicaid thresholds in a reduced form.
When estimating the eect of Medicaid policies on health or labor market outcomes,
using individual Medicaid eligibility as an independent variable leads to biased es-
timates. Actual eligibility is endogenous because Medicaid eligibility depends on
income, which may be correlated with the unobserved component of the outcome
variable. To avoid this problem, Currie and Gruber (1996) propose a simulated eli-
gibility measure. They draw a national sample of women for dierent demographic
cells and calculate the fraction eligible for Medicaid under every state's eligibility
rules for each of the cells. Hence, variation in this eligibility variable comes from
state policies and not from individual characteristics. Then they instrument indi-
vidual eligibility with this simulated eligibility measure. Instrumenting individual
Medicaid eligibility with the simulated eligibility measures does not lead to con-
sistent estimates, however, since the relationship between employment choice and
Medicaid choice is necessarily nonlinear because of the Medicaid eligibility rules. I
avoid this problem by using the simulated eligibility measure as a proxy instead of
as an instrument (Dave et al., 2011).
I follow Currie and Gruber's (1996) procedure with Dave et al.'s (2011) modi-
cation and divide the MEPS sample of single mothers into 30 demographic cells
based on age, race/ethnicity, and education. Then I draw 300 individuals from the
sample of the pooled 1996 to 2007 MEPS data for each cell and use the simulated
Medicaid eligibility rates in these cells as proxies for actual eligibility. Tables 4 and
5 show the regression results from linear probability models for each of the four em-
ployment choices, including only simulated parental Medicaid eligibility and both
parental and children's Medicaid eligibility, respectively.40
Parental Medicaid eligibility increases the likelihood of not working and reduces
full-time work with ESHI (Table 4). Adding simulated eligibility for children's
Medicaid makes the eects of parental Medicaid insignicant (Table 5). Children's
Medicaid eligibility decreases the odds of working full-time with ESHI and makes
full-time work without ESHI more likely. These results suggest that Medicaid ex-
pansions have two main eects on the employment choice of single mothers: 1) they
lead to work disincentives, consistent with Dave et al.'s (2011) ndings and 2) there
PPACA had been in eect during the sample period, 1996 to 2010.
40In addition to simulated Medicaid eligibility, these regressions include individual characteris-
tics, state-level variables describing the availability and cost of ESHI and labor market conditions,
and state and year xed eects.
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Table 4: Reduced Form-Results: OLS Regressions of Employment Choices on Sim-
ulated Medicaid Eligibility for Parents
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Non-work Part-time Full-time, Full-time,
no ESHI ESHI
Simulated Medicaid eligibility, mother 0.139*** 0.011 0.025 -0.172***
(0.031) (0.021) (0.024) (0.038)
Number of children aged 0 to 2 0.141*** -0.020* -0.029* -0.090***
(0.012) (0.011) (0.015) (0.013)
Number of children aged 3 to 4 0.075*** 0.007 0.003 -0.084***
(0.014) (0.010) (0.010) (0.013)
Number of children aged 5 to 10 0.047*** -0.001 0.009 -0.053***
(0.011) (0.005) (0.008) (0.007)
Number of children aged 11 or older 0.022** 0.002 0.026*** -0.046***
(0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009)
Any medical condition - mother -0.01 0.008 0.007 -0.007
(0.014) (0.014) (0.010) (0.015)
Number of medical conditions - mother 0.065*** -0.013*** -0.021*** -0.026***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
Any medical condition - children 0.026* -0.014 -0.003 -0.006
(0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.018)
Number of medical conditions - children -0.004 0.002 0 -0.001
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
State unemployment rate 0.025** -0.007 -0.005 -0.018*
(0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
Minimum wage -0.003 0.01 0.016 -0.015
(0.015) (0.009) (0.011) (0.012)
Hourly ESHI premium paid by employer 0.002 0.048* -0.015 -0.038
(0.026) (0.025) (0.026) (0.025)
Hourly ESHI premium paid by employee 0.027 -0.058 0.072* -0.045
(0.041) (0.038) (0.041) (0.045)
Fraction of rms oering ESHI 0.054 -0.203 0.101 -0.07
(0.206) (0.136) (0.159) (0.203)
Constant 0.879*** 0.487*** 0.091 -0.343**
(0.179) (0.142) (0.172) (0.161)
Observations 11,411 11,411 11,411 11,411
Notes: Medicaid eligibility simulated based on national sample of single mothers (see text for
details); age, age squared, black, Hispanic, education, and state and year xed eects included;
standard errors clustered at state-level in parentheses; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Source: Author's calculations.
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Table 5: Reduced-Form Results: OLS Regressions of Employment Choices on Sim-
ulated Medicaid Eligibility for Parents and Children
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Non-work Part-time Full-time, Full-time,
no ESHI ESHI
Simulated Medicaid eligibility, mothers 0.065 -0.05 -0.063 0.065
(0.064) (0.051) (0.047) (0.062)
Simulated Medicaid eligibility, children 0.092 0.076 0.109** -0.294***
(0.063) (0.058) (0.043) (0.059)
Number of children aged 0 to 2 0.141*** -0.020* -0.029* -0.090***
(0.012) (0.011) (0.015) (0.013)
Number of children aged 3 to 4 0.075*** 0.007 0.003 -0.083***
(0.014) (0.010) (0.010) (0.013)
Number of children aged 5 to 10 0.047*** -0.001 0.009 -0.053***
(0.011) (0.005) (0.008) (0.007)
Number of children aged 11 or older 0.021** 0.002 0.026*** -0.046***
(0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009)
Any medical condition - mother -0.01 0.008 0.008 -0.007
(0.014) (0.014) (0.010) (0.015)
Number of medical conditions - mother 0.065*** -0.014*** -0.021*** -0.026***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
Any medical condition - children 0.026* -0.015 -0.003 -0.005
(0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.018)
Number of medical conditions - children -0.004 0.003 0 -0.001
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
State unemployment rate 0.025** -0.007 -0.005 -0.016*
(0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
Minimum wage -0.002 0.011 0.019* -0.021*
(0.015) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
Hourly ESHI premium paid by employer 0.007 0.052** -0.01 -0.053**
(0.026) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026)
Hourly ESHI premium paid by employee 0.029 -0.057 0.074* -0.05
(0.040) (0.038) (0.041) (0.043)
Fraction of rms oering ESHI 0.067 -0.192 0.116 -0.111
(0.207) (0.137) (0.158) (0.193)
Constant 0.787*** 0.412** -0.019 -0.049
(0.190) (0.167) (0.169) (0.147)
Observations 11,411 11,411 11,411 11,411
Notes: Medicaid eligibility simulated based on national sample of single mothers (see text for
details); age, age squared, black, Hispanic, education, and state and year xed eects included;
standard errors clustered at state-level in parentheses; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Source: Author's calculations.
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is substantial crowding-out of ESHI. This nding is also consistent with the litera-
ture (Cutler and Gruber, 1996). Hence, expanding Medicaid eligibility aects single
mothers' work incentives at both ends of the labor supply distribution. However,
these results do not capture heterogeneous eects. To account for heterogeneity
and to allow for the dierent mechanisms in how Medicaid aects work incentives,
I estimate a structural model of labor supply with health insurance coverage. The
structural estimation has the added advantage of allowing me to simulate policy
counterfactuals.
6.2 Structural Estimation Results
Here, I present the estimation results for the three-step estimator described in Sec-
tion 4. I also discuss summary statistics for the simulated variables, such as earnings,
Medicaid eligibility, and medical expenditure, that are based on these estimates.
Table 6 shows the estimated coecients from the rst-step multinomial logit
model. The state- and year-specic eligibility threshold for parental Medicaid sig-
nicantly reduces the probability that a single mother chooses one of the three
employment choices involving a positive number of hours. This nding conrms
the reduced-form results in Table 4. Hence, higher Medicaid threshold and eligibil-
ity lead to work disincentives. I then use the multinomial logit estimates reported
in Table 6 to calculate polynomials of predicted choice probabilities that serve as
selection correction functions in the wage and medical expenditure regressions.
The results for the three separate log-wage regressions by observed employment
choice are reported in Table 7. The predicted choice probabilities are only signi-
cant in the full-time employment with ESHI regression. Moreover, single mothers
who live in a state with a higher minimum wage earn higher wages in all three em-
ployment alternatives, while the state-level unemployment rate generally does not
have a signicant eect. Other variables such as race, ethnicity, and education have
the expected signs.
Using the estimated conditional wage distributions, I simulate hourly wages
and monthly earnings for the three work alternatives. Their means and standard
deviations are shown in panel A of Table 8. Estimating a wage equation with
selection correction allows me to simulate wages and earnings for all individuals in
the sample, including those who do not work. The average hourly wage is $9 for
jobs without ESHI and $12.70 for jobs with ESHI. Average earnings are about $800,
$1,600, and $2,200 for part-time and full-time jobs without ESHI and full-time jobs
with ESHI, respectively.
Table 8: Summary Statistics of Simulated Outcomes by Employment Choice Under
Dierent Health Insurance Policies
Non-work Part-time Full-time, no ESHI Full-time, ESHI
A. Independent of Medicaid rules
Continued on following page
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Table 8 { continued from previous page
Non-work Part-time Full-time, no ESHI Full-time, ESHI
Hourly wage 0 8.993 8.994 12.678
(3.178) (3.139) (5.369)
Hours worked per week/40 0 0.515 1.008 1.011
(0.080) (0.066) (0.074)
Monthly earnings 0 808.60 1567.39 2239.06
(345.57) (567.15) (1083.28)
Monthly transfers 745.44 666.16 353.09 89.93
(250.90) (257.38) (337.75) (425.52)
B. Current Medicaid rules
Health insurance, mothers 1 0.862 0.598 1
(0.358) (0.497)
Health insurance, children 1 0.969 0.751 1
(0.170) (0.424)
OOP medical expenditure, mothers 180.73 170.15 191.1 701.57
(650.82) (475.92) (360.55) (808.38)
OOP medical expenditure, children 94.96 88.33 102.99 526.12
(810.46) (366.79) (489.98) (1388.67)
Monthly per-capita consumption 0.262 0.504 0.647 0.706
(in 1,000 1996 $) (0.067) (0.091) (0.101) (0.299)
C. PPACA Medicaid expansion only
Health insurance, mothers 1 0.992 0.831 1
(0.084) (0.365)
Health insurance, children 1 0.993 0.862 1
(0.083) (0.344)
OOP medical expenditure, mothers 120.37 121.57 144.11 863.36
(146.09) (147.90) (184.64) (748.07)
OOP medical expenditure, children 106.91 108.2 113.31 617.65
(315.00) (314.39) (316.22) (1301.81)
Monthly per-capita consumption 0.258 0.518 0.652 0.704
(in 1,000 1996 $) (0.067) (0.081) (0.097) (0.277)
D. PPACA Health insurance subsidies only
Health insurance, mothers 1 0.999 0.997 1
(0.022) (0.057)
Health insurance, children 1 1.000 0.998 1
(0.019) (0.061)
OOP medical expenditure, mothers 120.33 145.87 463.24 863.80
(144.45) (436.64) (758.05) (750.32)
OOP medical expenditure, children 106.48 130.79 280.91 617.53
(314.75) (1240.84) (529.97) (1300.65)
Monthly per-capita consumption 0.260 0.492 0.375 0.701
(in 1,000 1996 $) (0.059) (0.105) (0.298) (0.288)
Continued on following page
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Table 8 { continued from previous page
Non-work Part-time Full-time, no ESHI Full-time, ESHI
E. PPACA Medicaid expansion and subsidies
Health insurance, mothers 1 1.000 0.997 1
(0.021) (0.058)
Health insurance, children 1 1.000 0.998 1
(0.018) (0.062)
OOP medical expenditure, mothers 120.05 146.87 463.08 863.61
(145.33) (435.76) (757.65) (748.40)
OOP medical expenditure, children 107.06 131.66 281.39 616.69
(314.89) (1228.29) (530.27) (1301.44)
Monthly per-capita consumption 0.269 0.494 0.374 0.692
(in 1,000 1996 $) (0.067) (0.100) (0.307) (0.284)
Notes: Predicted outcomes by employment alternative based on wage and medical ex-
penditure regressions and dierent health insurance policies (current Medicaid policies,
Patient Protection and Aordable Care Act [PPACA] Medicaid expansions, PPACA
health insurance subsidies, and PPACA Medicaid expansions and health insurance sub-
sidies); means and standard deviations (in parentheses) shown.
Source: Author's calculations.
Monthly earnings determine government transfers and Medicaid eligibility
through various policy rules. Transfers are highest in the non-work alternative,
at about $750, since single mothers receive welfare and food stamp payments when
not working.41 Even for full-time jobs, transfers are positive on average due to the
Earned Income Tax Credit. Panel B of Table 8 contains average health insurance
coverage under current Medicaid rules.42 Coverage comes from Medicaid (for al-
ternatives non-work, part-time, and full-time without ESHI) if simulated monthly
earnings are below the relevant threshold, or from ESHI. All single mothers and
their children are eligible for Medicaid if they do not work, and the fraction covered
by health insurance when working full-time with ESHI is one by denition. Large
fractions of single mothers are eligible for Medicaid when holding part-time or even
full-time jobs. Eighty-six percent of single mothers are eligible when working part-
time and 60 percent are eligible when working full-time. For children's Medicaid,
97 and 75 percent are eligible, respectively.43
Table 9 contains the estimates from two-part models of mothers' and children's
out-of-pocket medical expenditure with selection correction. Controlling for demo-
graphics and medical conditions, ESHI coverage leads to higher lower out-of-pocket
expenditure, and children's Medicaid eligibility leads to expenditure. These esti-
mates point to higher cost sharing under ESHI. The number of medical conditions
41Transfers are calculated as the sum of welfare, food stamps, and taxes (federal income tax,
payroll taxes, and the Earned Income Tax Credit) based on the policy rules described in the online
appendix.
42Current Medicaid rules are those in place during the sample period 1996 to 2010.
43These fractions are higher than those reported in Table 2 since the latter are self-reported
Medicaid coverage rates while the averages in Table 8 are based on eligibility and assume full
take-up.
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Table 6: First-Step Multinomial Logit of Employment Choice
Part-time
Full-time, Full-time,
no ESHI ESHI
Age 0.111*** 0.145*** 0.370***
(0.0240) (0.0234) (0.0238)
Age squared -0.166*** -0.232*** -0.485***
(0.0327) (0.0322) (0.0317)
Black -0.466*** -0.256*** -0.348***
(0.0583) (0.0569) (0.0525)
Hispanic -0.418*** 0.0538 -0.341***
(0.0654) (0.0608) (0.0609)
Years of education 0.130*** 0.0826*** 0.318***
(0.0108) (0.00961) (0.0107)
Number of children -0.0943*** -0.0156 -0.261***
(0.0335) (0.0312) (0.0320)
Age of youngest child 0.0327*** 0.0518*** 0.0580***
(0.00771) (0.00734) (0.00680)
Any conditions - mother -0.388*** -0.467*** -0.477***
(0.0552) (0.0528) (0.0502)
Any conditions - children -0.154** -0.176*** -0.189***
(0.0604) (0.0575) (0.0551)
Medicaid threshold - mother / 1000 -0.0612** -0.101*** -0.240***
(0.0305) (0.0288) (0.0299)
Medicaid threshold - children / 1000 0.0173 -0.0140 -0.0286
(0.0418) (0.0406) (0.0394)
Constant -3.350*** -3.334*** -9.818***
(0.413) (0.400) (0.429)
Notes: Estimated coecients and standard errors (in parentheses) from multino-
mial logit with alternative-specic parameters. The baseline choice is non-work.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Source: Author's calculations.
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Table 7: OLS Regressions of Log-Wage by Observed Employment Choice
(1) (2) (3)
Part-time Full-time, Full-time,
no ESHI ESHI
Age -0.00489 0.0348*** 0.0215**
(0.0113) (0.00910) (0.0109)
Age squared 0.0129 -0.0465*** -0.0161
(0.0154) (0.0133) (0.0137)
Black -0.133*** -0.0475** -0.0500***
(0.0376) (0.0225) (0.0183)
Hispanic -0.203*** 0.00208 -0.0535**
(0.0446) (0.0296) (0.0238)
Years of education 0.0566*** 0.0436*** 0.0914***
(0.00534) (0.00448) (0.00747)
Any conditions - mother -0.0735*** -0.0484** 0.000389
(0.0272) (0.0237) (0.0174)
Unemployment rate 0.0131* 0.000572 0.00215
(0.00771) (0.00615) (0.00539)
Log-minimum wage 0.621*** 0.681*** 0.865***
(0.0939) (0.0735) (0.0663)
Predicted choice probability 18.60 16.63 -5.096***
(27.98) (18.32) (1.414)
Predicted choice probability2 -240.7 -145.4 18.00***
(270.1) (132.5) (6.226)
Predicted choice probability3 1026.9 462.5 -26.54**
(1106.0) (410.2) (11.24)
Predicted choice probability4 -1545.6 -500.4 14.47**
(1625.8) (459.8) (6.973)
Constant 0.379 -0.600 -0.396
(1.061) (0.931) (0.242)
State xed eects X X X
Number of observations 2274 2848 4284
Notes: Estimated coecients and standard errors (clustered on state-level, in
parentheses) from OLS regressions of log-hourly wage. For each regression, the
sample consists of single mothers whose observed employment choice is a given
alternative. Predicted choice probabilities are calculated based on multinomial
logit results reported in Table 5 and control for selection (see text). * p<0.1, **
p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Source: Author's calculations.
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Table 9: Two-Part Regressions of Out-of-Pocket Medical Expenditure Regressions
for Mothers and Children
Mothers Children
1(E>0) ln(E)jE>0 1(E>0) ln(E)jE>0
Probit OLS Probit OLS
Parental Medicaid -0.0293 0.0194
(0.0436) (0.0533)
Children's Medicaid -0.0646*** -0.0670**
(0.0241) (0.0317)
ESHI 0.492*** 0.341*** 0.461*** 0.503***
(0.0420) (0.0495) (0.0392) (0.0568)
Mothers' age -0.0507*** -0.00879
(0.0150) (0.0179)
Age squared 0.0740*** 0.0484**
(0.0209) (0.0242)
Black -0.256*** -0.661*** -0.515*** -0.665***
(0.0368) (0.0423) (0.0338) (0.0492)
Hispanic -0.184*** -0.239*** -0.240*** -0.270***
(0.0422) (0.0512) (0.0400) (0.0574)
Years of education 0.0695*** 0.0557*** 0.0599*** 0.114***
(0.00717) (0.00911) (0.00682) (0.0104)
Mother's conditions 0.420*** 0.217***
(0.0227) (0.0154)
Children's conditions 0.363*** 0.176***
(0.0236) (0.0209)
# children 0 to 2 0.210*** -0.0956
(0.0426) (0.0615)
# children 3 to 4 0.139*** -0.0383
(0.0442) (0.0630)
# children 5 to 10 0.139*** 0.0869**
(0.0311) (0.0423)
# children 11 to 18 0.212*** 0.303***
(0.0291) (0.0386)
Predicted choice probability -11.80*** -2.938 -6.595** -5.460
(3.521) (3.715) (3.086) (4.234)
Predicted choice probability2 53.67*** 9.298 28.55* 15.09
(16.86) (17.11) (14.62) (19.43)
Predicted choice probability3 -95.99*** -11.40 -47.38* -16.89
(32.26) (31.37) (27.57) (35.54)
Predicted choice probability4 59.84*** 5.136 28.09 6.900
(21.17) (19.72) (17.82) (22.29)
Constant 1.307*** 4.200*** -0.252 3.402***
(0.378) (0.446) (0.247) (0.357)
State xed eects X X X X
Number of observations 9670 7406 9670 6549
Notes: Separate two-part regressions of mothers' annual out-of-pocket medical expenditure
and sum of children's annual out-of-pocket medical expenditure (rst part: logit of positive
expenditure, second part: OLS of log-expenditure for positive expenditure); standard errors
clustered at state level in parentheses; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Source: Author's calculations.
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increases both the probability of observing positive expenditure and the level of
expenditure for mothers and children.
Using the functional-form assumption of the two-part model and the estimated
coecients, I obtain the conditional distributions of out-of-pocket medical expendi-
ture for mothers and children. Summary statistics for simulated expenditure under
current Medicaid rules are shown in panel B of Table 8. Based on simulated earnings,
transfers, and medical expenditure, I calculate monthly per capita consumption in
$1,000 in 1996 terms for all alternatives according to equation (13). This completes
the second step of the estimation procedure, which yields simulated values for the
arguments of the utility function (consumption, hours worked, and health insurance
coverage) under current Medicaid policies.
In the last step of the three-step estimation procedure, I estimate the preference
parameters of the empirical utility function in equation (12) via multinomial logit
with correlated random parameters (mixed logit). The estimated xed preference
parameters are shown in the top panel of Table 10. The consumption parameter
is positive and signicant. The utility constants for part-time work and full-time
with and without ESHI (j) are negative, which implies that single mothers prefer
not to work at all, conditional on the other arguments of the utility function. The
bottom panel of Table 10 contains the estimated mean and variance-covariance
coecients of the preference parameter distribution, i.e. the matrices  and  in
equation (14). The estimates show that women with young children dislike working
more. Mother's and children's medical conditions increase the marginal utility of
health insurance coverage, although only the parameter for children is statistically
signicant. The estimated variance-covariance matrix of the unobserved preference
components implies that single mothers who like working more also have a higher
preference for health insurance coverage for themselves. The unobserved components
of the preferences for own and children's health insurance are negatively correlated.
Since the coecients in Table 10 cannot be easily interpreted, I also report aver-
age marginal eects of the individual characteristics on the probability of choosing
each of the four employment alternatives in Table 11.44 Single mothers with a child
under the age of four are three percent more likely not to work, a little more likely
to work part-time, and one to 1.5 percent less likely to work full-time. Moreover,
the more medical conditions a single mother or her children have, the more likely
she is to choose the non-work and part-time alternatives, which make Medicaid cov-
erage more likely. This result implies that less healthy individuals are constrained
in their employment decisions because of health insurance availability. If health in-
surance were more easily available|such as under health care reform|women who
are afraid of losing Medicaid eligibility when working may enter the labor force or
work longer hours.
44I obtain the average marginal eects by rst calculating the marginal eect as the dierence in
predicted probabilities of choosing each employment alternative. Since the individual characteristics
are discrete variables, I calculate dierences in predicted probabilities based on a discrete change in
the independent variables instead of approximating an innitesimal change. Then I average these
marginal eects over all individuals, time periods, and simulation draws.
31
Table 10: Parameter Estimates for Third-Step Mixed Multinomial Logit
Fixed preference parameters
Consumption 9.152***
(0.135)
p -4.676***
(0.119)
f0 -8.292***
(0.217)
f1 -8.898***
(0.217)
Random preference parameters
Hours HI, mother HI, children
Mean of preference shocks -5.290*** -1.597*** 3.452***
(0.283) (0.611) (0.268)
Age -0.0264*** -0.00317
(0.004) (0.017)
Black 0.0894 -0.461 -0.191
(0.074) (0.330) (0.220)
Hispanic -0.000504 0.281 -0.426*
(0.075) (0.368) (0.237)
Number of kids under 4 -0.351***
(0.052)
Number of conditions, mother 0.159
(0.126)
Age of youngest child -0.112***
(0.018)
Number of conditions, children 0.245**
(0.101)
Variance of preference shocks
Hours 0.361***
(0.103)
Health insurance, mother 2.268*** 19.318***
(0.459) (2.756)
Health insurance, children 0.675*** -4.951*** 1.958***
(0.144) (1.063) (0.646)
Notes: The rst panel shows estimates of the xed preference parameters; the second panel
shows estimates of the eects of observables on preference parameters and estimates of the
means and variance-covariance matrix of the unobserved preference component (see equations
(12) and (14) in the text for the functional form of utility function and preference parameters);
block-bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Source: Author's calculations.
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Table 11: Marginal Eects of Observable Characteristics From Mixed Multinomial
Logit (in Percent)
Employment alternative
NW PT FT0 FT1
Age -0.207 -0.00567 0.118 0.0952
(0.00112) (0.000863) (0.000686) (0.000584)
Black 0.324 -0.258 -0.191 0.124
(0.00884) (0.00913) (0.00744) (0.0101)
Hispanic -0.143 -0.106 0.0447 0.205
(0.00545) (0.00696) (0.00623) (0.00619)
Children under 4 2.73 0.0409 -1.52 -1.26
(0.0141) (0.0114) (0.00899) (0.00805)
Mother's conditions 0.0861 0.0615 -0.0515 -0.0963
(0.00211) (0.00240) (0.00206) (0.00248)
Age of youngest child -0.0755 -0.0566 0.0347 0.0976
(0.00165) (0.00203) (0.00156) (0.00216)
Children's conditions 0.156 0.121 -0.0736 -0.204
(0.00345) (0.00438) (0.00329) (0.00460)
Notes: Average marginal eects (in percent) of discrete changes in the observable
characteristics, holding other variables constant at their actual values. NW=not
working; PT=part-time; FT0=full-time, no ESHI; FT1=full-time, ESHI. Block-
bootstrap standard errors in parentheses.
Source: Author's calculations.
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7 Policy Simulation
In this section, I simulate single mothers' employment choices under health care
reform using the preference parameter estimates from the previous section. Before I
present the simulation results, I derive theoretical predictions for labor supply and
take-up of ESHI in response to health care reform.
7.1 Theoretical Predictions for Labor Supply and Take-Up of ESHI
A simplied budget constraint for single mothers who may be eligible for Medicaid
and can obtain ESHI in full-time jobs is shown in consumption-leisure space in Figure
2a. Under current policies, mothers are eligible for Medicaid in the working-hours
range AB. Medicaid increases disposable income by the amount BC since it covers
most expenditures for health care. The amount BC depends on the mother's and her
children's health conditions and their associated health care costs. For simplicity,
I assume that single mothers are not eligible for Medicaid when working.45 The
segment CH corresponds to part-time work where no health insurance coverage is
available under current policies. When a mother works full-time without ESHI, her
budget constraint continues on the segment HK. When she works in a job with
health benets, the relevant segment is GL. This segment can have a dierent slope
than HK because jobs with ESHI may pay a dierent wage. Theory suggests that
the slope of GL should be smaller in absolute value than the slope of HK because of
the compensating wage dierential. Point G is higher than H because ESHI coverage
increases disposable income compared to being uninsured. Hence, the value of ESHI
is given by GH, which may be less than the value of Medicaid due to the higher
cost-sharing under ESHI. Depending on the family's health care needs, point L may
be above or below point K.
Health care reform changes the budget set in two ways.46 First, for a given wage,
it increases the range of hours in which individuals are eligible for Medicaid up to
point D (shown in Figure 2a). Second, it introduces health insurance subsidies in
the range EJ. While Medicaid remains free, the implicit wage of workers who are
covered by subsidized health insurance is lower, since subsidies decrease as earnings
grow. Hence, segment EJ has lower slope than CK, but a higher slope than GL
where no subsidies are available (see Figure 2b).47
The theoretical eects of expanding Medicaid without introducing health insur-
ance subsidies are ambiguous.48 Individuals who do not obtain ESHI when working
45Single mothers may not be able to nd a job that allows them to work the small number of
hours that would be required for Medicaid eligibility in states with low eligibility thresholds. The
segment \non-work" in Figures 2a and 2b refers to this hours range.
46Health care reform also includes other provisions such as employer mandates which may aect
employment, but since I only consider labor supply responses in this paper, I abstract from these
policy changes here.
47The budget constraint in Figure 2b is slightly simplied since the segment EJ, on which a
single mother is eligible for health insurance subsidies, has several small kinks (see Table 1).
48Although health care reform combines Medicaid expansions and health insurance subsidies, it
is important to analyze these policy changes separately. This allows me to infer which part of the
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Figure 2: Budget Sets Under Health Care Reform
full-time are subject to budget constraint ADFK while those with ESHI coverage
make decisions based on budget constraint ADFHGL (see Figure 2a). Single moth-
ers who do not work prior to the reform because they want to stay eligible for
Medicaid may enter the labor force and receive Medicaid coverage while working
part-time. For these individuals, the higher payo from working increases their la-
bor supply. On the other hand, increasing Medicaid eligibility also raises disposable
income in the range BD, which leads to higher demand for leisure. If this income
eect outweighs the reduced work disincentive (or substitution eect) labor supply
decreases. Moreover, the Medicaid \notch," i.e. the sharp drop in eligibility, moves
from point B to D so that individuals located above, but close to, point F on the
budget line have a lower incentive to work. They may reduce their labor supply to
obtain Medicaid coverage (Yelowitz, 1995).
In addition, individuals who work full-time with ESHI coverage may reduce their
labor supply to become eligible for Medicaid. As depicted in Figure 2a, the con-
sumption level when working part-time with Medicaid may be about as high as
when working full-time with ESHI because of the lower cost-sharing under Medi-
caid and the potential compensating wage dierential (points D and G). Therefore,
expanding Medicaid can lead to crowding-out of ESHI in addition to reducing labor
supply (Cutler and Gruber, 1996).49 Finally, individuals who work full-time with-
out ESHI are unlikely to change their labor supply. They reveal their preference
for consumption over health insurance and leisure. Hence, giving them the option
to obtain health insurance coverage at lower earnings does not make these workers
change their employment choice. The reduced-form results in Tables 4 and 5 show
reform aects employment and whether eects of dierent reform components might go in opposite
directions.
49To simplify the presentation, I assume that working full-time makes single mothers ineligible
for Medicaid under the expansion. There are workers with low wages, however, who may be eligible
for Medicaid when working full-time. These individuals may drop ESHI coverage without reducing
their labor supply.
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that existing Medicaid expansions reduce labor force participation and crowd out
ESHI, but may also lead to increasing labor supply at the intensive margin.
Combining Medicaid expansions and health insurance subsidies makes it more
likely for single mothers to increase their labor supply. As Figure 2b shows, the
Medicaid \notch" DF almost disappears. Since individuals who become ineligible
for Medicaid pay at most two percent of their income for subsidized health insur-
ance, the discontinuity in the budget line is reduced to DE. Overall, health insurance
subsidies increase the payo from working for single mothers who value health insur-
ance highly.50 Hence, these individuals are expected to increase their labor supply
and switch to part-time or full-time work without ESHI. On the other hand, for
individuals who do not value health insurance coverage, the subsidies imply work
disincentives since they include an implicit marginal tax on working.51 If there are
enough single mothers who value health insurance, however, expanding Medicaid
and introducing subsidized health insurance is expected to increase labor supply
overall.
The eligibility threshold for health insurance subsidies at 400 percent of the
FPL induces a potential work disincentive since individuals lose the benet if their
income exceeds this level. However, there are two reasons, why I do not expect this
eect to be important in the sample of single mothers. First, at 400 percent of the
FPL, individuals pay up to 9.5 percent of their income, which is not much dierent
from the average cost of ESHI.52 Hence, losing this benet does not have the same
eect as losing free health insurance coverage through Medicaid. Second, most single
mothers in this sample earn less than the 400 percent threshold. As the summary
statistics in Table 2 show, even women working full-time with ESHI earn only about
260 percent of the FPL on average. Therefore, the work incentives of health care
reform are likely to prevail among single mothers. In the general population, the
work disincentives are likely to dominate (Congressional Budget Oce, 2014).
In addition, health care reform can lead to lower take-up of ESHI. Full-time work
with ESHI is dominated by working full-time without ESHI but with subsidized
health insurance since disposable income is always higher on segment EJ than on
segment GL. Moreover, depending on the size of the compensating dierential, the
wage for full-time jobs with ESHI may be lower than the full-time wage without
ESHI net of health insurance costs. Hence, health care reform is predicted to lead
to crowding-out of ESHI.
In the simulations below, I consider a third policy counterfactual, which includes
health insurance subsidies but no Medicaid expansion. This simulation is particu-
larly policy-relevant because it corresponds to the environment in states that will
not implement the Medicaid expansions, whereas subsidies are a federal policy.53
50In order to qualify for health insurance subsidies under PPACA, individuals or families have
to earn at least 100 percent of the FPL.
51These implicit tax rates are shown in Table 1, and I account for them in the simulations below.
52According to MEPS data, average ESHI cost for family plans amounts to 17 percent of family
income. Since employers cover a part of this cost, individuals who become ineligible for subsidized
health insurance may pay not much more than 9.5 percent of their income for ESHI.
53See Section 2.2 on the Supreme Court decision that struck down the Medicaid expansion.
36
The budget set that corresponds to this counterfactual is described by ABCFEJK.
The only dierence to the \complete" PPACA policy counterfactual is the absence
of the segment BD. Depending on the pre-reform Medicaid threshold, there is now
a range where a single mother earns too much to qualify for Medicaid, but it not
eligible for subsidies since the latter start at 100 percent of the FPL. Many states
that will not implement the Medicaid expansions of the PPACA have Medicaid
thresholds for parents below that level (see Section 2.1).
The theoretical predictions for this counterfactual are similar to the one that
combines subsidies and Medicaid expansions. Without Medicaid expansions, the
possible reduction in labor supply disappears, so the prediction is unambiguously
positive. In particular, women who do not work under current Medicaid policies
may increase their labor supply enough in order to \jump" over the gap BD and
earn more than 100 percent of the FPL. At the same time, women located on the
segment CH before the reform do not have to decrease their labor supply in order to
qualify for Medicaid. Instead, they switch from the CH to the segment EG without
changing their labor supply, but attain a higher indierence curve.
So far, I have only considered the labor supply eects of Medicaid expansions
and health insurance subsidies that operate through changes in hours worked and
disposable income. In my model, however, I include health insurance coverage
in the utility function. To the extent that health insurance coverage aects the
marginal utility of consumption and leisure, changes in health insurance coverage
also inuence labor supply through this channel.54 For example, if better health due
to increased coverage raises the marginal utility from consumption more than the
marginal utility from leisure, expanding Medicaid and introducing subsidies leads to
a larger increase in labor supply. Single mothers who have a high valuation of health
insurance coverage because of their own or their children's medical conditions are
especially expected to change their behavior more when health care reform relaxes
the current restrictions on employment and health insurance availability. Hence,
these women are more likely to increase their labor supply.
7.2 Simulation Results
In this section, I use the estimates from Section 6.2 to simulate single mothers' em-
ployment choices under health care reform. I consider two provisions of PPACA:
1) Medicaid expansions and 2) health insurance subsidies. To assess whether these
two provisions have a dierential impact on labor supply, I simulate employment
choices separately under Medicaid expansions only, under subsidies only, and under
both provisions. Being able to disentangle the separate eects of these policy com-
ponents is another advantage of the structural estimation and simulation approach
in addition to conducting ex ante policy evaluation.
To obtain the arguments of the utility function, I simulate consumption accord-
ing to equation (13), health insurance coverage (equations (4) and (5) for Medicaid),
54Finkelstein, Luttmer, and Notowidigdo (2013) provide evidence on the positive relationship
between health status and marginal utility of consumption, for example.
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and medical expenditure (equation (11)) using the estimated conditional distribu-
tions from the rst-step regressions. I draw R1 = 1000 from these distributions for
each individual and time period. Summary statistics for the simulated utility argu-
ments are shown in panels C, D, and E of Table 8. Under Medicaid expansions only
(panel C), health insurance coverage increases substantially. When working part-
time, 99 percent of single mothers and their children are covered by Medicaid and
when working full-time, 83 percent of mothers and 86 percent of children are cov-
ered.55,56 Health insurance is universal under health insurance subsidies only (panel
D) and the combined policy (Medicaid expansions and health insurance subsidies,
panel E) for mothers and children with part-time and full-time employment without
ESHI.
These statistics show that health care reform will lead to a substantial increase
in health insurance coverage for single parent households.57 Average simulated
consumption is lower in panels D and E, which involve health insurance subsidies,
than under Medicaid expansion only (panel C), since cost-sharing under subsidized
health insurance is assumed to be the same as under ESHI and higher than under
Medicaid.
In addition to the utility arguments, I also simulate preference parameters by
drawing R2 = 1000 times from the estimated distribution N

Zi ^; ^

for each
individual, where ^ and ^ are the estimated matrices reported in Table 10. Then
I calculate the utility for every individual i, time period t, simulation draw r, and
employment alternative j under policy pol, U
pol;(r;s)
itj , according to equation (12).
The four policies considered are 1) current Medicaid rules, 2) PPACA Medicaid
expansions only, 3) PPACA health insurance subsidies only, and 4) a combination
of Medicaid expansions and health insurance subsidies.58 For each individual, time
period, and simulation draw, I calculate the alternative with the highest utility
under each policy, and average over i, t, and r for each j = n; p; f0; f1:
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The resulting choice fractions are reported in Table 12. I assess the model t by
comparing simulated choices under current Medicaid policies to actual choices in the
55Medicaid eligibility diers between mothers and children although the same threshold applies.
This dierence is due to a provision in PPACA that prohibits states to decrease Medicaid eligibility
below the thresholds in place in 2010 until 2014 for adults and 2019 for children.
56Since the MEPS data stem from a 15 year period, I use the FPL that was in eect in the
respective years to calculate the Medicaid eligibility threshold that enters the simulated health
insurance coverages. In other words, Medicaid eligibility is imputed as if the health care reform
had been in eect since 1996.
57I assume that everyone who is eligible to receive subsidies for health insurance also takes them
up since there is an individual mandate under PPACA. However, PPACA also allows individuals to
pay a tax of minfmaxf$695; 2:5% of incomeg; $2085g per year if they are not covered by a health
insurance plan.
58By current policies, I mean the Medicaid eligibility thresholds for parents and children that
were in place in the respective state of residence of the sample members in the years 1996 to 2010.
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Table 12: Simulated Employment Choice under Policy Counterfactuals
Employment alternative (fractions)
NW PT FT0 FT1
Observed 0.309 0.161 0.199 0.331
(0.00372) (0.00300) (0.00320) (0.00365)
Simulated
Current policies 0.311 0.148 0.212 0.329
(0.00268) (0.00124) (0.00144) (0.00247)
Medicaid only 0.326 0.148 0.218 0.308
(0.00271) (0.00111) (0.00140) (0.00240)
Subsidies only 0.295 0.119 0.387 0.200
(0.00116) (0.00140) (0.00172) (0.00208)
Complete PPACA 0.293 0.126 0.380 0.202
(0.00125) (0.00137) (0.00165) (0.00223)
Notes: Observed and simulated fractions choosing each employment alterna-
tive. NW=not working; PT=part-time; FT0=full-time, no ESHI; FT1=full-
time, ESHI. Block-bootstrap standard errors in parentheses.
Source: Author's calculations.
rst two rows of Table 12. Only the part-time and full-tim employment alternatives
without ESHI shows a small signicant dierence between observed and simulated
choice fractions. Hence, the model ts the observed choices well. In addition, I
compare predicted and observed employment choices by state and year (see Figure
3). These graphs, in which each point corresponds to a state-year cell, show an
overall good model t. In particular, the model predicts non-work and full-time
employment with ESHI well. The t for part-time and full-time work without ESHI
is a little less good since these two alternatives only dier in hours worked and are
dierentiated by an arbitrary cuto (35 hours).
The third row in Table 12 shows that simulated choices under PPACA's Med-
icaid expansions do not change substantially compared to current policies. The
percentage of single mothers in the non-work alternative increases by 1.5 percent-
age points, full-time employment without ESHI increases by 0.5 percentage points,
and full-time employment with ESHI decreases by two percentage points. The in-
come eect of increased Medicaid eligibility outweighs the substitution eect, and
this policy change leads to an overall decrease in labor supply. These simulation
results are consistent with the reduced-form results reported in Section 6.1. Both
sets of ndings indicate that Medicaid expansions lead to work disincentives at the
extensive margin and crowd out ESHI.
The fourth row in Table 12 shows several changes in simulated employment
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Figure 3: Scatter Plots of Average (by State and Year) Observed and Predicted Employment Choices
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under health insurance subsidies (without Medicaid expansions) compared to current
policies. In particular, the fraction of single mothers not working decreases by ve
percent. At the intensive margin, labor supply also increases. Fewer women work
part-time and the total fraction working full-time increases from 54 to 58 percent.
Hence, in contrast to Medicaid expansions, health insurance subsidies lead to an
increase in labor supply both at the extensive and intensive margins. At the same
time, there is crowding-out of ESHI. The fraction of single mothers in full-time
jobs with ESHI decreases from 33 to 20 percent while the fraction in full-time jobs
without ESHI grows from 21 to 39 percent. As shown in Table 8, panel D, virtually
all of these women are covered by subsidized health insurance.
The last row in Table 12 shows simulated employment fractions under PPACA
Medicaid expansions and health insurance subsidies. Labor supply increases at the
extensive and intensive margins and there is crowding-out of ESHI. The fraction
choosing the non-work alternative decreases by almost two percentage points com-
pared to current Medicaid rules, which corresponds to a six percent decrease. In
addition, there is an increase in labor supply at the intensive margin: part-time
work decreases by two percentage points and full-time work without ESHI almost
doubles from 22 to 38 percent. Hence, labor supply increases by ve percent at the
intensive margin. Finally, there is substitution of Medicaid and subsidized health
insurance for ESHI since full-time employment with ESHI decreases by almost 13
percentage points. Therefore, adding health insurance subsidies beyond the Medi-
caid eligibility threshold leads to a decrease in the Medicaid \notch" that is sucient
to increase labor supply as predicted in Section 7.1. Moreover, subsidized health
insurance constitutes a valuable alternative to ESHI.
Comparing the last two rows of Table 12 reveals that the simulated employment
fractions under both policies and health insurance subsidies only are very similar.
Hence, it is mostly the subsidies that change single mothers' labor supply. This result
is policy relevant since it shows that single mothers increase their labor supply in
states that do not implement the Medicaid expansion following the Supreme Court
decision.
In Table 13, I assess the amount of heterogeneity in the simulation results by
showing the same statistics as in Table 12 by individual characteristics. I focus on
the policy simulation with Medicaid expansions and health insurance subsidies here
(corresponding to the nal row in each panel of Table 13). First, comparing panels
A.1 and A.2 reveals that the increase in labor force participation and the crowding-
out of ESHI are mostly concentrated among single mothers without young children.
Second, panels B.1 and B.2 show that single mothers with medical conditions react
more strongly to health care reform. In particular, they are more likely to work
full-time without ESHI and more likely to enter the labor force. Hence, health care
reform allows women with a higher need for health insurance to obtain subsidized
health insurance instead of relying on ESHI. These single mothers benet from
health care reform because they gain access to health insurance. In addition, the
reform reduces restrictions in employment choice that force single mothers with
medical conditions to not work at all or to work full-time with ESHI under pre-
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Table 13: Simulated Employment Choice under Policy Counterfactuals by Observable Characteristics
NW PT FT0 FT1 NW PT FT0 FT1
A.1 Children under four A.2 No children under four
Observed 0.402 0.181 0.219 0.199 0.267 0.151 0.191 0.391
(0.00683) (0.00537) (0.00571) (0.00540) (0.00435) (0.00361) (0.00385) (0.00467)
Simulated
Current policies 0.388 0.164 0.200 0.248 0.276 0.141 0.218 0.366
(0.00482) (0.00225) (0.00252) (0.00340) (0.00314) (0.00147) (0.00176) (0.00320)
Medicaid only 0.409 0.167 0.191 0.233 0.287 0.139 0.231 0.343
(0.00495) (0.00206) (0.00251) (0.00320) (0.00313) (0.00130) (0.00168) (0.00310)
Subsidies only 0.401 0.145 0.277 0.177 0.249 0.108 0.435 0.209
(0.00171) (0.00244) (0.00286) (0.00273) (0.00148) (0.00170) (0.00213) (0.00271)
Complete PPACA 0.388 0.154 0.275 0.183 0.249 0.113 0.428 0.210
(0.00187) (0.00238) (0.00252) (0.00291) (0.00158) (0.00166) (0.00212) (0.00292)
B.1 Mother has medical conditions B.2 Mother has no medical conditions
Observed 0.368 0.143 0.176 0.313 0.262 0.175 0.218 0.345
(0.00625) (0.00476) (0.00488) (0.00594) (0.00459) (0.00386) (0.00418) (0.00463)
Simulated
Current policies 0.307 0.139 0.201 0.352 0.315 0.155 0.220 0.310
(0.00441) (0.00192) (0.00225) (0.00414) (0.00337) (0.00161) (0.00187) (0.00308)
Medicaid only 0.315 0.140 0.215 0.329 0.334 0.154 0.221 0.291
(0.00443) (0.00174) (0.00224) (0.00404) (0.00342) (0.00144) (0.00179) (0.00297)
Subsidies only 0.275 0.106 0.426 0.192 0.311 0.129 0.355 0.205
(0.00198) (0.00217) (0.00267) (0.00335) (0.00142) (0.00182) (0.00224) (0.00266)
Complete PPACA 0.274 0.113 0.418 0.195 0.307 0.136 0.349 0.207
(0.00212) (0.00213) (0.00260) (0.00361) (0.00155) (0.00178) (0.00213) (0.00284)
C.1 Children have medical conditions C.2 Children have no medical conditions
Observed 0.364 0.149 0.179 0.308 0.287 0.165 0.208 0.34
(0.00765) (0.00586) (0.00619) (0.00713) (0.00424) (0.00349) (0.00373) (0.00425)
Simulated
Current policies 0.313 0.145 0.202 0.340 0.311 0.149 0.216 0.324
(0.00541) (0.00246) (0.00290) (0.00475) (0.00308) (0.00143) (0.00166) (0.00289)
Medicaid only 0.324 0.146 0.213 0.317 0.326 0.149 0.221 0.304
(0.00545) (0.00227) (0.00287) (0.00462) (0.00312) (0.00127) (0.00160) (0.00279)
Subsidies only 0.293 0.118 0.380 0.209 0.296 0.119 0.391 0.195
(0.00232) (0.00276) (0.00330) (0.00390) (0.00133) (0.00162) (0.00201) (0.00245)
Complete PPACA 0.291 0.125 0.373 0.211 0.293 0.126 0.383 0.198
(0.00254) (0.00270) (0.00315) (0.00416) (0.00144) (0.00159) (0.00193) (0.00263)
Notes: Observed and simulated fractions choosing each employment alternative for the indicated subsamples. NW=not
working; PT=part-time; FT0=full-time, no ESHI; FT1=full-time, ESHI. Block-bootstrap standard errors in parentheses.
Source: Author's calculations.
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reform policies. Third, the dierence between the simulated employment choices of
single mothers with children with and without medical conditions is very small (see
panels C.1 and C.2 in Table 13).
Finally, I asses the welfare implications of these changes in single mothers' em-
ployment decisions due to health care reform. Given the distributional assumptions
in equation (12) that lead to the multinomial logit estimation of the preference
parameters, I calculate the change in consumer surplus between the baseline (cur-
rent Medicaid policies) and one of the three simulated PPACA environments for
individual i, time period t, and simulation draws r and s as
CS
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and average over i, t, r, and s (Train, 2009, p. 55). ^C is the estimated preference
parameter for monthly consumption (see Table 10), hence the change in consumer
surplus is on the monthly level.
Table 14 shows average changes in consumer surplus for the three policies coun-
terfactuals considered here. In the rst column, I report averages over the whole
sample. Under the Medicaid expansions, single mothers' consumer surplus does not
change in an economically signicant manner. Under health insurance subsidies
and the combined policy, however, these women gain on average about $200 per
month. Splitting up the sample by mother's and children's medical conditions and
presence of young children, Table 14 shows that single mothers with at least one
condition and those with less healthy or young children gain about $30 more per
month from the reform than less disadvantaged women. The latter results show
that single mothers who are especially vulnerable due to health reasons or young
children benet particularly from the subsidy component of PPACA.
Moreover, the welfare gains outweigh the increase in costs due to PPACA. I
account for three types of costs: 1) government transfers (welfare, food stamps, and
taxes), 2) Medicaid, and 3) health insurance subsidies.59 On average, these costs
increase by about $150 per family per month under the policy counterfactual that
includes both Medicaid expansions and health insurance subsidies. Assuming that
higher taxes in this order of magnitude would not signicantly alter single mothers'
labor supply, the government could collect the required $150 to make this reform
revenue neutral while still increasing average welfare.
59Average transfers are shown in Table 8, panel A. For Medicaid costs, I use average yearly
per-capita payments for adults and children from the CMS (https://www.cms.gov/Medicare-
MedicaidStatSupp/09 2010.asp, Tables 13.13 and 13.14). The cost of health insurance subsidies
is equal to average ESHI costs by year and state minus the maximum paid by individuals according
to the sliding scale in Table 1.
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Table 14: Change in Consumer Surplus Under Policy Counterfactuals by Observable Characteristics
Overall Mother's med. conditions Children's med. conditions Young Children
No Yes No Yes No Yes
Medicaid only -0.00945 -0.0101 -0.00841 -0.00968 -0.00878 -0.00626 -0.0159
(0.000379) (0.000498) (0.000577) (0.000423) (0.000829) (0.000367) (0.000865)
Subsidies only 0.199 0.188 0.216 0.193 0.216 0.184 0.229
(0.00197) (0.00244) (0.00334) (0.00227) (0.00396) (0.00250) (0.00314)
Complete PPACA 0.185 0.173 0.206 0.178 0.205 0.174 0.209
(0.00198) (0.00245) (0.00334) (0.00228) (0.00398) (0.00251) (0.00316)
Notes: Changes in consumer surplus in 1000 dollars. Baseline is the simulated choice under existing policies. Young
children refers to any children under four. Block-bootstrap standard errors in parentheses.
Source: Author's calculations.
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8 Discussion and Conclusion
This paper assesses the employment eects of Medicaid expansions and health in-
surance subsidies under PPACA among single mothers. To this end, I estimate a
structural model of labor supply on a sample of single mothers from the MEPS,
exploiting variation in Medicaid eligibility thresholds across states and time.
The simulated employment choices show that Medicaid expansions and premium
subsidies have two main eects. They increase labor force participation by six
percent and raise labor supply at the intensive margin by ve percent. In addition,
I nd crowding-out of ESHI amounting to 40 percent. The latter nding is consistent
with the literature. For example, Cutler and Gruber (1996) nd crowding-out of
ESHI in response to Medicaid expansion for children and pregnant women of 31 and
49 percent, respectively.
My simulation results are also consistent with the predictions made by the Con-
gressional Budget Oce (2014). Although the CBO predicts an overall decline in
employment due to health insurance subsidies and Medicaid expansions, the report
argues that individuals who were eligible for Medicaid before reform (mostly low-
income parents) will likely increase their labor supply. The present paper shows
theoretically that health insurance subsidies are responsible for the increase in labor
supply among single mothers by eliminating the Medicaid \notch" in the budget
constraint. The policy simulations conrm this eect.
The six percent increase in labor supply at the extensive margin implies that
786,000 single mothers will enter the labor force, compared to the overall drop
in employment by 2.0 million full-time equivalent workers predicted by the CBO.
This result is important because single mothers constitute a particularly vulnerable
population with limited access to health insurance. Health care reform is designed
to reduce this lack of health insurance, but might be expected to lead to work
disincentives. This would make the reform more expensive as women who are driven
out of the labor force would rely on welfare. My simulation results show that
this scenario will not occur under health care reform. Hence, health care reform
achieves two policy goals: 1) reducing the number of uninsured single mothers and
2) providing incentives for increased labor supply in this population.
My simulation results reveal considerable heterogeneity in single mothers' em-
ployment choice under health care reform. In particular, women with a higher
demand for health insurance due to medical conditions increase their labor supply
more and are more likely to drop ESHI. This result shows that single mothers, whose
need for health insurance coverage currently restricts their employment choice to
not working or a full-time job with ESHI, can switch to a better employment option
while retaining health insurance coverage.
A comparison of the costs and benets of this reform reveals positive implications
for average welfare. However, a denite answer to the question of whether health
care reform is welfare improving would have to incorporate the taxes necessary to
pay for Medicaid and health insurance subsidies. Since increased taxes would lead
to lower labor supply, the estimates provided in Table 14 are an upper limit for the
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average welfare gain.
The results presented here only apply to single mothers and cannot easily be
extended to other groups. In particular, the low average earnings even when work-
ing full-time imply that there is no work disincentive at the income cuto when
eligibility for health insurance subsidies ends. Hence, the simulated increase in full-
time work among single mothers may not carry over to other groups. Kolstad and
Kowalski (2012) nd that the Massachusetts health care reform did not lead to a
signicant change in labor supply at the extensive margin, and hours worked and
earnings decreased. However, their results apply to a broader population than the
one considered in this paper. Garthwaite, Gross, and Notowidigdo (2013) argue that
their nding of increased labor supply due to Medicaid disenrollment implies em-
ployment reductions caused by PPACA. Without an explicit model of labor supply
and health insurance choice, it is dicult to make such a claim, however, due to the
dierences between Medicaid and health insurance subsidies. A main contribution
of the present paper is its structural estimation approach that allows me to simulate
the eects of health insurance subsidies without observing this type of policy in the
data. I show that subsidies lead to increasing labor supply among single mothers
who had access to Medicaid before the reform. Given that other existing studies
do not present results on the labor supply of single mothers and this subpopulation
depends particularly on public or subsidized health insurance, the ndings presented
here are policy relevant in their own right.
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